The common law Rule of Completeness was designed to prevent parties from introducing incomplete—and thereby misleading—statements at trial. It ensured fundamental fairness by ensuring that a fact finder heard an entire statement or series of statements if the whole would “complete” the partial evidence presented. It served this important role in Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries before the drafters of Federal Rule of Evidence 106 attempted to capture its essence in 1975. Unfortunately, what was once a simple and principled rule has been muddled by Federal Rule of Evidence 106 (FRE 106). The common law rule language was lost when FRE 106 was drafted, and there is no agreement as to what portion of the common law survived and what was left behind. Particularly problematic are the issues of whether FRE 106 applies to oral as well as written statements, and whether FRE 106 allows a court to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence. The federal and state courts are split on these issues, and the United States Supreme Court has failed to provide guidance. Academics and commentators in the past have suggested these issues should be solved by amending FRE 106. However, these suggested amendments have generally been limited to FRE 106 itself, and each has tucked the equivalent of a new hearsay exception into an amended 106—a departure from the otherwise well-ordered Federal Rules of Evidence. This Article critically examines current Rule of Completeness jurisprudence. It compares and contrasts the common law with FRE 106, and then dives deeply into state and federal courts disparate interpretations of FRE 106. Finally, it recommends that the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee resolve doctrinal conflicts inherent in Rule 106 and draft two new Rules of Evidence. First, it recommends an expanded and clarified Federal Rule of Evidence 106 that applies to both written and oral statements. Second, it recommends a new addition to FRE 803 that would create a hearsay exception for statements otherwise qualified for admission under FRE 106 but currently barred under the Rule Against Hearsay.

普通法完整性规则旨在防止当事人在审判中引入不完整的——从而误导——陈述。它通过确保事实发现者听到整个陈述或一系列陈述来确保基本公平，前提是整体“完整”了所提供的部分证据。在联邦证据规则 106 的起草者在 1975 年试图捕捉其本质之前，它在英美法理学中扮演了这个重要角色的几个世纪。不幸的是，曾经简单而有原则的规则已经被联邦证据规则 106（FRE 106)。起草 FRE 106 时，普通法规则的语言已经丢失，对于普通法的哪些部分幸存下来以及哪些部分被遗留下来，没有达成一致意见。特别成问题的问题是 FRE 106 是否适用于口头和书面陈述，以及 FRE 106 是否允许法院采纳其他不可采信的证据。联邦和州法院在这些问题上存在分歧，美国最高法院未能提供指导。过去，学术界和评论员都建议通过修改 FRE 106 来解决这些问题。 然而，这些建议的修改通常仅限于 FRE 106 本身，并且每个人都将相当于新传闻例外的内容塞进了修订后的 106 中——背离来自其他井井有条的联邦证据规则。本文批判性地审查了当前的完整性规则法理学。它将普通法与 FRE 106 进行比较和对比，然后深入研究州和联邦法院对 FRE 106 的不同解释。最后，它建议联邦证据规则咨询委员会解决规则 106 中固有的教义冲突，并起草两个新的证据规则。首先，它建议扩大和澄清联邦证据规则 106，适用于书面和口头陈述。其次，它建议对 FRE 803 增加一个新的补充，这将为根据 FRE 106 有资格但目前根据反对传闻规则禁止的陈述创建传闻例外。它建议扩大和澄清联邦证据规则 106，适用于书面和口头陈述。其次，它建议对 FRE 803 增加一个新的补充，这将为根据 FRE 106 有资格但目前根据反对传闻规则禁止的陈述创建传闻例外。它建议扩大和澄清联邦证据规则 106，适用于书面和口头陈述。其次，它建议对 FRE 803 增加一个新的补充，这将为根据 FRE 106 有资格但目前根据反对传闻规则禁止的陈述创建传闻例外。