Advocates for the psychological construction of emotion view themselves as articulating a non-essentialist alternative to basic emotion theory's essentialist notion of affect programs. Psychological constructionists have also argued that holding essentialist assumptions about emotions engenders misconceptions about the psychological constructionist viewpoint. If so, it is important to understand what psychological constructionists mean by “essentialism” and “non-essentialism.” To advance the debate, I take a deeper dive into non-essentialism, comparing the non-essentialist views of the early empiricists with those of the psychological constructionists, focusing on the theories of James Russell and Lisa Barrett. Using Lakatos’ notion of scientific research programs, I also describe how Russell's and Barrett's views have evolved into different and potentially competing research programs under the psychological constructionist banner.

情感心理建构的倡导者认为，他们表达了一种非本质主义的替代方案，可以替代基本情感理论的情感程序的本质主义概念。心理建构主义者还认为，对情绪持有本质主义假设会导致对心理建构主义观点的误解。如果是这样，重要的是要了解心理建构主义者所说的“本质主义”和“非本质主义”是什么意思。为了推进辩论，我更深入地探讨了非本质主义，将早期经验主义者的非本质主义观点与心理建构主义者的非本质主义观点进行了比较，重点是詹姆斯·罗素和丽莎·巴雷特的理论。使用拉卡托斯的科学研究计划概念，我还描述了罗素和巴雷特的