Many presidents have been interested in asserting authority over in-dependent regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board. The underlying debates raise large constitutional questions, above all about the meaning and justification of the idea of a “unitary exec-utive.” In the first instance, however, the President’s authority over inde-pendent agencies depends not on the Constitution but on a common statutory phrase, which allows the President to discharge the heads of such agencies for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” This phrase—the INM standard—is best understood to create a relationship of presidential review—and a particular remedy for legal delinquency flowing from that review. It allows the President to discharge members of independ-ent agencies not only for laziness and torpor (inefficiency) or for corruption (malfeasance) but also for neglect of their legal duties, which includes egre-giously erroneous decisions of policy, law, or fact, either repeatedly or on unusually important matters. Connecting this understanding to the Take Care Clause, we reject both a minimalist approach, which deprives the President of any kind of decisionmaking authority over policy made by inde-pendent agencies, and also a maximalist approach, which would treat the independent agencies as essentially identical to executive agencies in terms of presidential oversight authority. This approach has strong implications for how to understand the President’s supervisory authority over independ-ent agencies. It suggests that he has such authority insofar as he is attempt-ing to ensure against “neglect of duty,” but not if he is displacing their policymaking discretion.

中文翻译：

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总统审查：总统对独立机构的法定权力

许多总统都对行使对独立监管机构的权力感兴趣，例如联邦贸易委员会、联邦通信委员会、核监管委员会、证券交易委员会和联邦储备委员会。潜在的辩论引发了大量的宪法问题，尤其是关于“单一行政机构”理念的含义和正当性的问题。然而，首先，总统对独立机构的权力不取决于宪法，而是取决于一个共同的法定短语，该短语允许总统因“效率低下、疏忽职守或办公室渎职”而罢免此类机构的负责人。 . ” 这个短语——INM 标准——最好理解为建立一种总统审查关系——以及针对该审查产生的法律违法行为的特殊补救措施。它允许总统不仅因为懒惰和麻木（效率低下）或腐败（渎职）而解雇独立机构的成员，而且还可以因为他们忽视法律职责，包括严重错误的政策、法律或事实决定，无论是反复出现还是在非常重要的事情上。将这种理解与“小心谨慎”条款联系起来，我们既反对极简主义的方法，它剥夺了总统对独立机构制定的政策的任何决策权，也拒绝了极简主义的方法，这将在总统监督权力方面将独立机构视为与行政机构基本相同。这种方法对于如何理解总统对独立机构的监督权具有重要意义。这表明他拥有这样的权力，因为他试图确保不会“疏忽职守”，但如果他正在取代他们的决策自由裁量权，则不会。