Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-rate subsidy to underwrite hundreds of billions of dollars of imports. Whereas estimates from traditional models would make Chávez look like a welfare maximizer, our results indicate that he implemented distortionary commercial policy to the benefit of special interests. Our analysis underscores the importance of tailoring workhorse models to account for differences in interest group configuration. The politics of trade policy is not reducible to the politics of protectionism.

中文翻译：

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套利大厅：双重汇率的理论和证据

贸易政治的基础理论强调消费者福利和保护主义游说之间的冲突。但这些理论忽略了其他影响贸易政策的强大游说团体。我们提出了一种由消费者福利和进口商游说团之间的冲突引起的贸易扭曲理论。我们使用来自委内瑞拉的原始数据估算了模型的关键参数——政府对福利的权重，其中 Hugo Chávez 使用汇率补贴为数千亿美元的进口提供担保。虽然传统模型的估计会使查韦斯看起来像一个福利最大化者，但我们的结果表明他实施了扭曲的商业政策以谋取特殊利益。我们的分析强调了调整主力模型以解决利益集团配置差异的重要性。