The burgeoning literature on corporate governance, both in economics and in law, has focused heavily on the agency costs of delegated management. It is therefore striking to encounter a large number of well-established and highly successful companies that have long been under the complete control of a self-appointing board of directors whose compensation is divorced from the profitability of the company and who cannot be removed or replaced by anyone except themselves.

中文翻译：

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基金会公司的治理

在经济和法律领域，关于公司治理的新兴文献都集中在委托管理的代理成本上。因此，令人惊讶的是，遇到了许多长期受自任命董事会完全控制的，信誉卓著且成功的公司，这些董事的薪酬与公司的获利能力相去甚远，并且无法将其撤职或更换。除自己以外的任何人。