Abstract

Equatorial Guinea is not only one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes but also a striking case of regime and leader survival. This small, oil-rich state and personalist regime defies conventional wisdom because it is both far more resilient and faces far fewer threats from within the regime and from opposition political parties than other resource-rich states. But how does the regime manage to survive? This study argues that four key mechanisms interact to explain Equatorial Guinea’s record of authoritarian survival. Firstly, co-optation (via patronage, party, and cabinet appointments) which President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and the regime party—Partido democrático de guinea ecuatorial—have used to build internal cohesion and fragment opposition. Secondly, the crafting of restrictive institutional rules (party and electoral laws) that, combined with informal rules, aim to protect the regime’s interests and make participation in political opposition more costly. Thirdly, the use of (selective and diffuse) repression to shield the regime and shrink the living space of challengers. Finally, the regime’s international linkages and projection to gain credibility and offset pressure for change. We argue that autocrats’ survival depends on their ability to play a strategic two-level game: domestic and international.

中文翻译：

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赤道几内亚的独裁生存政治：选民，限制性制度规则，镇压和国际预测

摘要

赤道几内亚不仅是世界上最专制的政权之一，而且还是政权和领导人生存的惊人案例。这个规模小，石油丰富的国家和个人主义政权违背了传统常识，因为与其他资源丰富的国家相比，该政权既更具弹性，又面临着政权内部和反对党的威胁。但是，该政权如何生存呢？这项研究认为，四个关键机制相互作用来解释赤道几内亚的威权主义生存记录。首先，由特奥多罗·奥比昂·恩格马·姆巴索戈总统和政权党通过增选（通过赞助，政党和内阁任命）—几内亚民主政治党-曾经建立了内部凝聚力和碎片对抗。其次，拟订限制性制度规则（政党和选举法），与非正式规则相结合，旨在保护政权的利益，并使参加政治反对派的代价更高。第三，使用（选择性和扩散）镇压来掩盖政权并缩小挑战者的生存空间。最后，该政权在国际上的联系和计划获得了公信力并抵消了变革的压力。我们认为，独裁者的生存取决于他们玩战略两级游戏的能力：国内和国际。