A mental state is luminous if, whenever an agent is in that state, they are in a position to know that they are. Following Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits, a wave of recent work has explored whether there are any non-trivial luminous mental states. A version of Williamson's anti-luminosity appeals to a safety-theoretic principle connecting knowledge and confidence: if an agent knows p, then p is true in any nearby scenario where she has a similar level of confidence in p. However, the relevant notion of confidence is relatively underexplored. This paper develops a precise theory of confidence: an agent's degree of confidence in p is the objective chance they will rely on p in practical reasoning. This theory of confidence is then used to critically evaluate the anti-luminosity argument, leading to the surprising conclusion that although there are strong reasons for thinking that luminosity does not obtain, they are quite different from those the existing literature has considered. In particular, we show that once the notion of confidence is properly understood, the failure of luminosity follows from the assumption that knowledge requires high confidence, and does not require any kind of safety principle as a premise.

中文翻译：

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对亮度失去信心

一个精神状态是发光的，如果当一个代理人处于那种状态时，他们能够知道他们是。继蒂莫西·威廉姆森（Timothy Williamson）的《知识及其极限》之后，最近的一波工作探索了是否存在任何不平凡的发光心理状态。威廉姆森反光度的一个版本诉诸于将知识和信心联系起来的安全理论原则：如果代理人知道p，那么在她对 p 具有相似信心水平的任何附近场景中p都是正确的。然而，相关的置信度概念相对未被充分探索。本文提出了一个精确的置信度理论：代理人对 p 的置信度是他们依赖 p 的客观机会在实际推理中。然后，这种信心理论被用来批判性地评估反光度论点，得出了令人惊讶的结论，即尽管有充分的理由认为光度没有获得，但它们与现有文献所考虑的完全不同。特别是，我们表明，一旦正确理解了置信度的概念，光度的失败源于这样的假设，即知识需要高度的置信度，并且不需要任何类型的安全原则作为前提。