This article studies the effects of traditional chiefs—a common type of broker—on voters’ ability to extract state resources from politicians. Using original data from Northern Ghana, the author shows that chieftaincy positions invented by colonial authorities are especially prone to capture, leaving voters worse off compared both to more accountable chiefs whose authority dates to the precolonial period and to voters who lack formal chiefs who can serve as brokers. The latter comparison exploits exogenous assignment of ethnic groups to the colonial invention of chieftaincy in the late nineteenth century. The findings suggest that whether voters benefit from brokers amidst clientelistic electoral competition depends on the accountability relationship between brokers and their clients.

中文翻译：

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殖民发明的选举后果：加纳北部的经纪人、酋长和分销

本文研究了传统酋长——一种常见的经纪人——对选民从政客那里榨取国家资源的能力的影响。作者使用加纳北部的原始数据表明，殖民当局发明的酋长职位特别容易被俘虏，与权力可追溯至前殖民时期的更负责任的酋长相比，与缺乏可以服务的正式酋长的选民相比，选民的处境更糟作为经纪人。后一种比较利用了 19 世纪晚期酋长制的殖民发明，种族群体的外生分配。调查结果表明，在客户主义选举竞争中，选民是否受益于经纪人取决于经纪人与其客户之间的问责关系。