Property rights are important for economic exchange, but in many parts of the world, they are not publicly guaranteed. Private market associations can fill this gap by providing an institutional structure to enforce agreements, but with this power comes the ability to extort from group members. Under what circumstances do private associations provide a stable environment for economic activity? The author uses survey data collected from 1,179 randomly sampled traders across 199 markets in Lagos, Nigeria, and finds that markets maintain institutions to support trade not in the absence of government, but rather in response to active government interference. The author argues that associations develop protrade policies when threatened by politicians they perceive to be predatory and when the organizations can respond with threats of their own. The latter is easier when traders are not competing with one another. To maintain this balance of power, an association will not extort; it needs trader support to maintain the credibility of its threats to mobilize against predatory politicians.

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非正式市场中的秩序政治：来自拉各斯的证据

产权对于经济交换很重要，但在世界许多地方，它们并没有得到公开保障。私人市场协会可以通过提供制度结构来执行协议来填补这一空白，但这种权力带来了向集团成员勒索的能力。私人协会在什么情况下为经济活动提供了稳定的环境？作者使用从尼日利亚拉各斯 199 个市场的 1,179 名随机抽样交易者收集的调查数据，发现市场维持机构以支持贸易不是在没有政府的情况下，而是为了应对政府的积极干预。作者认为，当受到他们认为具有掠夺性的政治家的威胁以及组织可以用自己的威胁做出回应时，协会会制定促进贸易政策。当交易者不相互竞争时，后者更容易。为了维持这种权力平衡，协会不会敲诈勒索；它需要贸易商的支持来维持其威胁的可信度，以动员起来打击掠夺性的政客。