The European Union provided a mixed response to the 2008 financial crisis. On the one hand, it refused to pursue fiscal integration through a common budget; on the other, it introduced significant transfers between countries that were designed to produce financial stabilization. The authors analyze this response as the outcome of democratic constraints on EU leaders. Given the EU’s current institutional structure, citizens’ preferences pose a binding constraint on what leaders can do as these preferences limit the scope of risk-pooling among members and the degree of political tolerance for different courses of action. The authors show that citizens’ preferences reflect differences in the geography of income, production regimes, and institutional organization. The heterogeneity of constituencies’ redistribution preferences combined with a diverse economic geography helps to explain why political constraints on national governments prevent them from engaging in further fiscal integration. By contrast, externalities among member states shift the preferences of citizens who may experience negative effects and make international redistribution politically feasible. The authors analyze these two mechanisms and present novel empirical results on the determinants of preferences for fiscal integration and international redistribution in the aftermath of the eurocrisis.

中文翻译：

---

欧洲危机的政治地理

欧盟对 2008 年金融危机的反应不一。一方面，它拒绝通过共同预算实现财政一体化；另一方面，它引入了旨在实现金融稳定的国家之间的大量转移。作者将这种反应分析为对欧盟领导人的民主限制的结果。鉴于欧盟目前的制度结构，公民的偏好限制了领导人可以做什么，因为这些偏好限制了成员之间风险分担的范围以及对不同行动方针的政治容忍程度。作者表明，公民的偏好反映了收入、生产制度和制度组织的地理差异。选区再分配偏好的异质性与多样化的经济地理相结合，有助于解释为什么对国家政府的政治限制会阻止它们参与进一步的财政一体化。相比之下，成员国之间的外部性改变了可能遭受负面影响的公民的偏好，并使国际再分配在政治上可行。作者分析了这两种机制，并就欧洲危机后财政一体化和国际再分配偏好的决定因素提出了新的实证结果。会员国之间的外部性改变了可能受到负面影响的公民的偏好，使国际再分配在政治上可行。作者分析了这两种机制，并就欧洲危机后财政一体化和国际再分配偏好的决定因素提出了新的实证结果。会员国之间的外部性改变了可能受到负面影响的公民的偏好，使国际再分配在政治上可行。作者分析了这两种机制，并就欧洲危机后财政一体化和国际再分配偏好的决定因素提出了新的实证结果。