How did political institutions emerge and evolve under colonial rule? This article studies a key colonial actor and establishes core democratic contradictions in European settler colonies. Although European settlers’ strong organizational position enabled them to demand representative political institutions, the first hypothesis qualifies their impulse for electoral representation by positing the importance of a metropole with a representative tradition. Analyzing new data on colonial legislatures in 144 colonies between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries shows that only British settler colonies—emanating from a metropole with representative institutions—systematically exhibited early elected legislative representation. The second hypothesis highlights a core democratic contradiction in colonies that established early representative institutions. Applying class-based democratization theories predicts perverse institutional evolution—resisted enfranchisement and contestation backsliding—because sizable European settler minorities usually composed an entrenched landed class. Evidence on voting restrictions and on legislature disbandment from Africa, the British Caribbean, and the US South supports these implications and rejects the Dahlian path from competitive oligarchy to full democracy.

中文翻译：

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欧洲定居者殖民地的民主矛盾

殖民统治下的政治制度是如何出现和演变的？本文研究了一个关键的殖民行为者，并确定了欧洲定居者殖民地的核心民主矛盾。尽管欧洲定居者强大的组织地位使他们能够要求具有代表性的政治机构，但第一个假设通过假设具有代表性传统的大都市的重要性来证明他们对选举代表的冲动。对 17 世纪至 20 世纪 144 个殖民地的殖民地立法机构的新数据分析表明，只有英国殖民者殖民地——来自具有代表性机构的大都市——系统地展示了早期选举产生的立法代表。第二个假设突出了建立早期代议制机构的殖民地的核心民主矛盾。应用以阶级为基础的民主化理论预测了不正当的制度演变——抵制选举权和倒退的竞争——因为大量的欧洲定居者少数民族通常组成一个根深蒂固的土地阶级。来自非洲、英属加勒比地区和美国南部的投票限制和立法机构解散的证据支持这些影响，并拒绝从竞争寡头政治到完全民主的大丽道路。