The object of this paper is to understand how central–local relations and internal technical characteristics contribute to performance reporting delays at the local level in a Global South context.,The paper develops and tests four propositions using a combination of secondary data analyses and semistructured interviews with 30 local government officials.,The findings indicate that delays in performance reporting are generally high in pre-election years because leadership commitments at the local level largely shift toward national politics (campaigning for re-election of the president). Additional reporting delays were found to be the result of low financial capacity to maintain appropriate data collection and management systems, lack of highly trained monitoring and evaluation experts at the local level and lack of sanctions for noncompliance.,The fact that some types of Districts (large municipalities and metro areas with access to large financial resources) were excluded from the analysis induces some bias to the findings. The choice of 30 out of a total 260 local governments limits the analyses to only 12% of views and perceptions of local government reporting delay. Additionally sourcing responses from a few monitoring and evaluation (M&E) personnel out of hundreds of mid- to upper-level employees limited the breath of discussions that could have resulted from a broader study.,The results of this paper suggest that any attempt at imposing sanctions on late reporting may not be very successful since national party politics, which lie outside the control of municipalities, is one of the main factors that drive reporting delay. Rather than imposing sanctions, government should consider incentivizing the reporting process. On the other hand, since internally generated funds (IGF) and the M&E team are factors that lie within the control of the municipality, any attempt to decrease reporting delay should first focus on improving local revenues and strengthening municipal M&E capacity building.,This paper adds to the existing literature by offering directions for approaching performance reporting delay in two ways. First, it emphasizes central–local relations as an important political determinant of performance reporting delay. Second, it explores reporting delay in Ghana's local governments and therefore provides useful insights from a Global South perspective.

中文翻译：

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地方政府的绩效报告延迟：全球视角

本文的目的是了解在全球南方环境下，中央与地方的关系和内部技术特征如何导致绩效报告延迟。本文通过结合二次数据分析和半结构化访谈来开发和测试四个命题调查结果表明，选举前的表现通常会延迟，因为在地方选举中，领导层的承诺大部分转向了国家政治（竞选总统的竞选活动），因此选举结果的延迟通常在选举前几年较高。发现额外的报告延迟是由于维持适当的数据收集和管理系统的财务能力低，缺乏地方一级训练有素的监测和评估专家以及缺乏对不遵守情事的制裁的结果。分析中排除了某些类型的地区（大型城市和拥有大量财务资源的都会区）的事实，这引起了对结果的偏见。在总共260个地方政府中选择30个，将分析限制在对地方政府报告延迟的观点和看法中只有12％。此外，从数百名中高层员工中获取一些监控和评估（M＆E）人员的回复，也限制了更广泛研究可能引起的讨论的呼吸。本文的结果表明，进行任何强加于人的尝试延迟报告的制裁可能不会很成功，因为不受市政当局控制的民族政党政治是导致报告延迟的主要因素之一。与其实施制裁，政府应考虑激励报告流程。另一方面，由于内部产生的资金（IGF）和M＆E团队是市政当局控制的因素，因此，减少报告延迟的任何尝试都应首先着重于提高地方收入和加强市政M＆E能力建设。通过以两种方式提供处理性能报告延迟的指示，从而增加了现有文献的数量。首先，它强调中央与地方之间的关系是绩效报告延迟的重要政治决定因素。其次，它探讨了加纳地方政府的报告延迟问题，因此从全球南方的角度提供了有用的见解。E团队是市政当局控制范围内的因素，任何减少报告延迟的尝试都应首先着重于提高地方收入和加强市政监测与评估能力建设。两种方式。首先，它强调中央与地方之间的关系是绩效报告延迟的重要政治决定因素。其次，它探讨了加纳地方政府的报告延迟问题，因此从全球南方的角度提供了有用的见解。E团队是市政当局控制范围内的因素，任何减少报告延迟的尝试都应首先着重于提高地方收入和加强市政监测与评估能力建设。两种方式。首先，它强调中央与地方之间的关系是绩效报告延迟的重要政治决定因素。其次，它探讨了加纳地方政府的报告延迟问题，因此从全球南方的角度提供了有用的见解。本文通过以两种方式提供处理性能报告延迟的方法来补充现有文献。首先，它强调中央与地方之间的关系是绩效报告延迟的重要政治决定因素。其次，它探讨了加纳地方政府的报告延迟问题，因此从全球南方的角度提供了有用的见解。本文通过以两种方式提供处理性能报告延迟的方法来补充现有文献。首先，它强调中央与地方之间的关系是绩效报告延迟的重要政治决定因素。其次，它探讨了加纳地方政府的报告延迟问题，因此从全球南方的角度提供了有用的见解。