Leaders are incentivized to repress in the face of mobilized dissent. However, leaders are unable to repress alone and rely on repressive agents, who can shirk the order and weaken the leader’s control. I use a formal model to analyze when the leader can use repression strategically to avoid defection, based on leader type. Each type has incentives to repress to distort the leader’s risk of removal and thus deter defection. Power, cost, and uncertainty are important in both the leader’s and the agent’s decision to repress. Testable hypotheses reveal how executive power and punishment influence the level of repression.

中文翻译：

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镇压剂叛逃：权力，成本和不确定性如何影响军事行为和国家镇压

激励领导人面对动员的异议者进行镇压。但是，领导者无法独自镇压并依靠镇压者，他们可以推翻命令并削弱领导者的控制力。我使用正式模型根据领导者类型分析领导者何时可以策略性地使用镇压来避免叛逃。每种类型都有诱因来压制以扭曲领导者被罢免的风险，从而阻止叛逃。权力，成本和不确定性对领导者和代理人的压制决定都至关重要。可检验的假设揭示了行政权力和惩罚如何影响压制水平。