书评Steven Hecht Orzack 和Elliott Sober (eds.), Adaptationism and Optimality。剑桥哲学和生物学研究。剑桥：剑桥大学出版社 (2001)，xv + 404 页，75.00 美元（布），28.00 美元（纸）,Philosophy of Science

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书评Steven Hecht Orzack 和Elliott Sober (eds.), Adaptationism and Optimality。剑桥哲学和生物学研究。剑桥：剑桥大学出版社 (2001)，xv + 404 页，75.00 美元（布），28.00 美元（纸）
Philosophy of Science ( IF 1.4 ) Pub Date : 2002-12-01 , DOI: 10.1086/344632
Scott Carson

巴特曼关于原则性忽视细节的论点的失败，在文本中没有明确区分从“渐近论”导出的论点。巴特曼的书可以教给对还原和涌现感兴趣的非物理学哲学家什么？我认为，这些读者会发现这本书很难写：有很多关于物理学的详细讨论，但没有物理学以外的例子。巴特曼确实讨论了将心理状态简化为物理学的可能性，但只是用最抽象的术语。这本书的价值在于它所提出的概念可能性。巴特曼肯定是对的，在某些领域（无论是心理学，我不太确定）多重可实现属性在科学上是富有成效的，因为实现者的差异在解释上是无关紧要的。他也是对的，我认为，认为高级科学的自主性在于高级词汇的效用，用于系统地忽略不相关的低级细节。在消极方面，这本书几乎没有持续的哲学理论化。我们没有得到急需的“渐近分析”的一般特征。我们没有得到关于细节何时与理解现象无关的说明。对于所有关于还原的评论，我们也没有给出一个一般标准来决定什么时候一个理论可以被另一个解释，或者一个理论的本体何时出现。尽管如此，这里有很多可供科学哲学家寻找新思想的机会。我非常希望 Batterman 的书能够成功地将这些想法放在哲学菜单的顶部。

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Book ReviewSteven Hecht Orzack and Elliott Sober (eds.),Adaptationism and Optimality. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2001), xv + 404 pp., $75.00 (cloth), $28.00 (paper.)

cance of Batterman’s arguments concerning the principled neglect of detail, which are not clearly distinguished in the text from arguments derived from “asymptotics.” What can Batterman’s book teach the non-philosopher of physics interested in reduction and emergence? These readers will, I think, find the book hard going: there are many detailed discussions of the physics, and no worked examples from outside of physics. Batterman does discuss the possible reduction of mental states to physics, but only in the most abstract terms. The value of this book is rather in the conceptual possibilities that it limns. Batterman is surely right that in some domains (whether psychology, I am not so sure) multiply realizable properties are scientifically fruitful because differences in the realizers are explanatorily irrelevant. He is right, too, I think, in holding that the autonomy of higher-level sciences resides in the utility of higher-level vocabulary for systematically ignoring irrelevant low-level details. On the negative side, the book contains little in the way of sustained philosophical theorizing. We are not given a much-needed general characterization of “asymptotic analysis.” We are not given an account of when a detail is or is not irrelevant to understanding a phenomenon. Nor, for all the comments on reduction, are we given a general criterion for deciding when one theory can be explained by another, or when a theory’s ontology is emergent. Still, there is plenty here for a philosopher of science in search of fresh ideas to feed on. I very much hope that Batterman’s book will succeed in putting these ideas near the top of the philosophical menu.

更新日期：2002-12-01

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