本文认为思想是情感的必要条件。因此,它反对 Zajonc 采取的立场,该立场反映了对情绪认知过程的含义的两种普遍误解:(a) 对相遇对一个人的幸福的重要性的认知评估必须发生在固定阶段,通过来自环境的最初无意义输入的信息处理;(b) 这种评估必然是经过深思熟虑的、理性的和有意识的。还简要讨论了情绪认知理论的一些系统发育和个体发育影响。近年来,心理学家看待情绪的方式发生了重大变化——重新发现情绪是认知过程的产物。情绪反应是由低等动物的评价性感知引起的,在人类中,通过复杂的“对事件对一个人福祉的重要性的认知评估”。尽管关于情绪与认知之间的关系还有许多其他问题,但我的评论将集中在思想在情绪反应中的作用。我会经常提到 Zajonc (1980) 对认知发生在情感之前的假设的挑战。我用他的观点来说明人们对将认知称为情感的因果前因意味着什么的普遍误解。我还使用他的观点作为出发点,论证认知活动是情绪的必要条件也是充分条件。情绪需要认知调解吗?我自己在这个问题上的立场是一系列以认知评价概念为中心的情绪理论的变体。例如,Campos 和 Sternberg (1981) 指出“最近的情绪研究历史一直被强调认知因素的方法所主导。在成人情绪反应的理论中,认知评估现在作为中心结构”(第 273 页) )。它的作用是,调解人与环境之间的关系。评估过程会产生或大或小强度的特定情绪,这取决于如何根据个人的幸福感来评估这种关系。认知评估意味着一个人在任何特定时刻解释自己困境的方式对情绪反应至关重要。认知和情感在自然界中通常是融合在一起的(Folkman、Schaefer 和 Lazarus,1979),尽管它们可以在某些异常或异常状态下分离。例如,认知应对过程(cf. Lazarus, 1981),例如旨在调节情绪的孤立和智力化(或分离),可以在思想和情绪之间造成分离。此外,攻击可以不愤怒,回避可以不恐惧。这些后一种情况也是思想和感觉之间通常的联系已经松动或中断的情况。然而,这种分离通常不是生活规则,而是在特殊情况下应对的产物。完整的情绪体验(例如与假怒相反)通常包括三个融合的组成部分:思想、行动冲动和躯体障碍。当这些成分被分离出来时,我们就会得到不同于我们所说的真实情绪状态的东西。我们的情绪理论必须反映正常的融合,分离思想、行动冲动和躯体障碍,除非在某些特定条件下(如过去的教师心理学所做的那样——将认知、情感和动机视为独立的实体)扭曲而不是澄清思想的结构(参见 Lazarus、Coyne 和 Folkman,1982 年)。上述分析的一个后果是,通常来自认知理论陈述的含义是,认知评估是必要的 我要感谢我的研究同事 Susan Folkman 和我的秘书 Carol Carr,他们提供了大量的编辑建议本文。我欣赏他们的技巧和判断力。重印请求应发送至加州大学伯克利分校心理学系 Richard S. Lazarus,地址:4105 Tolman Hall, Berkeley, California 94720。37、9号、1019-1024 版权所有 1982 美国心理学会公司 美国心理学家 • 1982 年 9 月 • 1019 0003-066X/82/3709-1019$00.75 I 以及情绪的充分条件。Zajonc (1980) 尖锐地批评了这种立场。他写道,在当代心理学理论中,情感被错误地认为是后认知的,只有在进行了广泛的认知操作之后才会发生,而实际上,情感判断是相当独立的,甚至先于他们所说的知觉和认知活动。依靠。Zajonc 认为,情感不仅可以在没有广泛的知觉和认知编码的情况下发生——甚至更早——而且情感和认知是由独立的和部分独立的神经系统控制的(另见 Tomkins,1981)。因此,Zajonc 似乎在说两件与我所争论的相反的事情:第一,认知决定情感的拟议方向是错误的,而实际方向是对认知的情感;第二,认知和情感应该被看作是相对独立的子系统,而不是相互融合和高度依赖的子系统。为了建立他的论点,Zajonc 引用了 ee cummings (1973) 中的一段诗:既然感觉是第一位的,那么关注事物句法的人永远不会完全吻你。(p. 160) 他还引用了 Wundt (1907) 的情感首要概念,并且 Bartlett (1932)、Ittelson (1973)、Osgood (1962) 和 Premack (1976) 都采纳了感觉第一的观点。他说,例如:。<事实上,有机体的第一阶段完全有可能' 对刺激的反应和检索中的第一个元素是情感的。更有可能的是,在我们确切地知道它是什么之前,甚至可能不知道它是什么之前,我们就可能喜欢或害怕它。(p. 154) Zajonc 分析中最严重的错误在于他的认知方法,这是当今大部分认知心理学的特征。在这种方法中,信息和意义源于作为计算机类比的思维概念(香农和韦弗,1962),纽厄尔和西蒙(1961)和韦纳(1960)的工作也说明了这一观点。这一观点已被德雷福斯(Dreyfus,1972)、波兰尼(Polanyi,1958,1966)等人反驳,尽管反驳并未影响认知心理学的主流。主流立场是,决定和行动的意义是从本质上无意义的刺激显示元素或位中建立起来的,并且系统地扫描这种显示会产生信息。因此,人类的认知,就像计算机的操作一样,通过连续接收、注册、编码、短期或长期存储以及“检索无意义的位——一种被称为“信息处理”的意义转换来进行。 ,或 Abelson (1963) 提到的热认知,是通过这样的处理建立起来的。然而,正如 Erdelyi (1974) 和其他人 (例如,Neisser,1967) 所建议的,情绪可以在任何阶段影响这个过程。考虑到这一点,Zajonc 可能会因为情绪位于曲折的信息处理认知链的末端而感到困扰,因此认为有必要提出一个独立的系统,使快速、非反射性的情绪反应成为可能。正如许多人所争论的那样(Folkman 等人,1979 年;Wrubel、Benner 和 Lazarus,1981 年),人类是意义导向的、创造意义的生物,他们不断从他们的幸福的角度来评估事件,并对某些事情做出情绪化的反应。这些评价。因此,Zajonc 断言意义是直接固有的,没有冗长或连续的处理,而是出于错误的原因。在我看来,Zajonc 赞同的传统信息处理方法定义的意义概念有一个完全合理——而且更好——的替代方案。我们不必总是等待信息处理的启示来解开环境代码。正如在感知新面貌运动中所争论的那样,个人因素,如信仰、期望、动机或承诺,在任何相遇的一开始都会影响注意力和评价。对个体差异的关注不可避免地导致对个人意义的关注以及形成这些意义的因素。我们积极地选择和塑造经验,并在某种程度上将其塑造成我们自己的要求(另见 Rychlak,1981)。信息处理作为一种排他性的认知模型并没有充分关注作为意义来源的人。关于从属现象的辩论历史具有指导意义(见 Eriksen, 1956, 1960, 1962; Lazarus, 1956; Lazarus & McCleary, 1951)。在一个有争议的实验中,麦克利里和我表明,通过将一组无意义的音节与痛苦的电击的威胁联系起来,受试者随后会选择性地对电击相关的音节做出皮肤电反应,即使他们有误解和误报, 他们。我们将这种现象称为“无意识自主歧视”或“sub1020 • SEPTEMBER 1982 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST ception”,认为受试者以某种方式感觉到了威胁,而没有有意识地识别音节。这种解释引发的辩论涉及许多复杂的问题,
"点击查看英文标题和摘要"
Thoughts on the relations between emotion and cognition.
This paper argues that thought is a necessary condition of emotion. It therefore opposes the •stance taken by Zajonc, which reflects two widespread misunderstandings about what is meant by cognitive processes in emotion: (a) that a cognitive appraisal of the significance of an encounter for one's well-being must occur in fixed stages through the information processing of initially meaningless inputs from the environment; and (b) that such an appraisal is necessarily deliberate, rational, and conscious. Some of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic implications of a cognitive theory of emotion are also discussed briefly. Recent years have seen a major change in the way psychologists view emotion—the rediscovery that emotions are products of cognitive processes. The emotional response is elicited by an evaluative perception in lower animals, and in humans by a complex 'cognitive appraisal of the significance of events for one's well-being. Although there are many other issues concerning the relations between emotion and cognition, my comments will focus on the role of thought in the emotional response. I will refer often to Zajonc's (1980) challenge to the assumption that cognition occurs prior to emotion. I use his views to illustrate widespread misunderstandings of what it means to speak of cognition as a causal antecedent of emotion; I also use his views as a point of departure for rny argument that cognitive activity is a necessary as well as sufficient condition of emotion. Do Emotions Require Cognitive Mediation? My own position on this question is a variant of a family of theories of emotion centered on the concept of cognitive appraisal. Campos and Sternberg (1981) state, for example, that "The recent history of the study of emotion has been dominated by approaches stressing cognitive factors. In theories of adult emotional response, cognitive appraisal now functions as the central construct" (p. 273). Its role is, to mediate the relationship between the person and the environment. The appraisal process gives rise to a particular emotion with greater or lesser intensity depending on how the relationship is evaluated with respect to the person's well-being. Cognitive appraisal means that the way one interprets one's plight at any given moment is crucial to the emotional response. Cognition and emotion are usually fused in nature (Folkman, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1979), although they can be dissociated in certain unusual or abnormal states. For example, cognitive coping processes (cf. Lazarus, 1981) such as isolation and intellectualization (or detachment), which are aimed at regulating feelings, can create a dissociation between thoughts and feelings. Moreover, attack can occur without anger, and avoidance without fear. These latter conditions are also instances in which the usual link between thought and feeling has been loosened or broken. Yet such separations are less often a rule of living and more often a product of coping under special circumstances. The full experience of emotion (as opposed to sham rage, for example) normally includes three fused components: thoughts, action impulses, and somatic disturbances. When these components are dissociated we are left with something other than what we mean by a true emotional state. Our theories of emotion must reflect the normal fusion, and separating thoughts, action impulses, and so^ matic disturbances except under certain specifiable conditions (as was done in the old days of faculty psychology—which treated cognition, emotion, and motivation as independent entities) distorts rather than clarifies the structure of the mind (cf. Lazarus, Coyne, & Folkman, 1982). One bit of fallout from the above analysis is the implication, often derived from statements of cognitive theory, that cognitive appraisal is a necessary I wish to thank my research colleague, Susan Folkman, and my secretary, Carol Carr, for providing substantial editorial advice on this article. I appreciate their skill and judgment. Requests for reprints should be sent to Richard S. Lazarus, Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, 4105 Tolman Hall, Berkeley, California 94720. Vol. 37, No. 9, 1019-1024 Copyright 1982 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • SEPTEMBER 1982 • 1019 0003-066X/82/3709-1019$00.75 I as well as sufficient condition of emotion. Such a position has been criticized trenchantly by Zajonc (1980). He writes that affect is erroneously regarded in contemporary psychological theory as postcognitive, occurring only after extensive cognitive operations have taken place, and that in actuality affective judgments are fairly independent of, and even precede, the perceptual and cognitive activities on which they are said to depend. Zajonc argues that not only can affect occur without extensive perceptual and cognitive encoding—and even before—but that affect and cognition are controlled by separate and partially independent neural systems (see also Tomkins, 1981). Zajonc thus seems to be saying two things contrary to what I have argued: first, that the proposed directionality in which cognition determines affect is wrorig and that the actual direction is affect to cognition; and second, that cognition and affect should be regarded as relatively independent subsystems rather than as fused and highly interdependent. Building his argument, Zajonc cites a stanza of poetry from e. e. cummings (1973): since feeling is first who pays any attention to the syntax of things will never wholly kiss you. (p. 160) He also cites Wundt's (1907) concept of affective primacy, and Bartlett (1932), Ittelson (1973), Osgood (1962), and Premack (1976) as having adopted the view that feelings come first. He states, for example: . < In fact, it is entirely possible that the very first stage of the organism's reaction to stimuli and the very first elements in retrieval are affective. It is further possible that we can like something or be afraid of it before we know precisely what it is and perhaps even without knowing what it is. (p. 154) The most serious mistake in Zajonc's analysis lies in his approach to cognition, which is characteristic of much of present-day cognitive psychology. In this approach information and meaning stem from the conception of mind as an analogue to a computer (Shannon & Weaver, 1962), a view illustrated also by the work of Newell and Simon (1961) and Weiner (I960). This conception has been rebutted by Dreyfus (1972), Polanyi (1958, 1966), and others, although the rebuttal has not affected the mainstream of cognitive psychology. The mainstream stance is that meanings for decision and action are built up from essentially meaningless stimulus display elements or bits and that systematic scanning of this display generates information. Thus, human cognition, like the operations of a computer, proceeds by serially receiving, registering, encoding, storing for the shortor longrun, and "retrieving meaningless bits—a transformation to meaning that is called "information processing." Meanings and their associated emotions, or hot cognitions as Abelson (1963) referred to them, are built through such processing. As Erdelyi (1974) and others (e.g., Neisser, 1967) have suggested, however, emotion can influence the process at any of its stages. With this in mind, it is not surprising that Zajonc might be troubled by the implication that emotion lies at the end of a tortuous cognitive chain of information processing, and therefore find it necessary to suggest an independent system making possible rapid, nonreflective emotional reactions. As many have argued (Folkman et al., 1979; Wrubel, Benner, & Lazarus, 1981), humans are meaning-oriented, meaning-creating creatures who constantly evaluate events from the perspective of their well-being and react emotionally to some of these evaluations. Zajonc is therefore correct in asserting that meanings are immediately inherent in emotionally laden transactions without lengthy or sequential processing, but for the wrong reasons. In my view, the concept of meaning defined by the traditional information processing approach subscribed to by Zajonc has a perfectly reasonable-—and better—alternative. We do not always have to await revelation from information processing to unravel the environmental code. As was argued in the New Look movement in perception, personal factors such as beliefs, expectations, and motives or commitments influence attention and appraisal at the very outset of any encounter. Concern with individual differences leads inevitably to concern with personal meanings and to the factors that shape such meanings. We actively select and shape experience and in some degree mold it to our own requirements (see also Rychlak, 1981). Information processing as an exclusive model of cognition is insufficiently concerned with the person as a source of meaning. The history of debate about the phenomenon of subception is instructive (see Eriksen, 1956, 1960, 1962; Lazarus, 1956; Lazarus & McCleary, 1951). In a controversial experiment, McCleary and I showed that by associating a set of nonsense syllables to the threat of a painful electric shock, subjects would later react with a galvanic skin response selectively to the shock-associated syllables, even when they had misperceived and misreported, them. We referred to this phenomenon as "autonomic discrimination without awareness," or "sub1020 • SEPTEMBER 1982 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST ception," arguing that subjects somehow sensed the threat without consciously recognizing the syllables. The debate sparked by this interpretation touched on many complex issues, but it mainly centered on a claim by Bricker and Chapanis (1953) and Eriksen (1956, 1960, 1962) that even though the subjects had misreported what had been flashed on the screen, they probably had registered perceptually some of the structural elements of the syllables and had, in effect, reacted automatica