On the standard view, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. But what, exactly, does this function amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the most general burden of reasoning on their opponents? In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and argue that the standard accounts of deontic function are at least ambiguous (because two types of presumptions entail distinct conceptions of the “burden of proof”), and likely implausible. As a result, they require qualifications.

中文翻译：

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关于推定、举证责任和解释

在标准观点中，所有推定都具有相同的道义功能：它们不对称地分配举证责任。但是，这个功能到底是什么？一旦假设被拒绝，他们是否会将争论的负担、解释的负担或最普遍的推理负担放在对手身上？在本文中，我考虑了认知推定和实践推定之间的差异，并认为道义功能的标准解释至少是模棱两可的（因为两种类型的推定都包含不同的“举证责任”概念），并且可能不可信。因此，他们需要资格。