In a paper (Mizrahi 2013a) and a reply to critics (Mizrahi 2016a) published in Informal Logic, I argue that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. To appeal to expert opinion is to take an expert’s judgment that p is the case as (defeasible) evidence for p. Such appeals to expert opinion are weak, I argue, because the fact that an expert judges that p does not make it significantly more likely that p is true or probable, as evidence from empirical studies on expert performance suggests (Mizrahi 2016a, pp. 246-247). Unlike other critics of this argument (e.g., Seidel 2014 and Walton 2014), who take issue with the empirical evidence on expert performance, David Botting (2018) says that he wants to take issue with the premise that reliability is a necessary condition for the strength of appeals to expert opinion. I respond to Botting’s objections and argue that they miss their intended target. I also argue that his attempt to show that arguments from expert opinion are strong is unsuccessful.

中文翻译：

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你会尊重我的权威！？对 Botting 的回复

在 Informal Logic 发表的一篇论文 (Mizrahi 2013a) 和对批评者的回复 (Mizrahi 2016a) 中，我认为来自专家意见的论点是弱论点。诉诸专家意见就是将专家对 p 的判断作为 p 的（可废止的）证据。我认为，这种对专家意见的诉求是微弱的，因为专家判断 p 的事实并没有使 p 为真或很可能的可能性大大增加，正如专家表现的实证研究所表明的那样（Mizrahi 2016a，第 246 页） -247）。与此论点的其他批评者（例如，Seidel 2014 和 Walton 2014）不同，他们对专家表现的经验证据提出异议，David Botting（2018）说他想对可靠性是可靠性是诉诸专家意见的力度。我回应了 Botting 的反对意见，并认为他们没有达到预期的目标。我还争辩说，他试图表明专家意见的论点是有力的，但没有成功。