While territorial disputes have long been considered essential in the study of interstate conflict, the existing literature has largely overlooked the actual initiation of territorial disputes in the first place. The conventional wisdom holds that, given that the anticipated consequences of dispute escalation are likely to be worse for weaker states than for stronger states, the former should be less likely than the latter to initiate a dispute. However, a large proportion of territorial disputes have in fact been initiated by weaker states. Why does a weaker state initiate a territorial claim over its relatively stronger counterpart? Drawing insights from the work on reputation building in the recent interand intra-state conflict literature, this article provides an explanation that focuses on the role of information and uncertainty in the initiation of territorial disputes. A potential weaker challenging state’s decision to initiate a territorial dispute against a relatively stronger state depends upon information about whether or not the potential stronger target has made concessions in past disputes, and whether or not the potential stronger target may be expected to do so again in the future. Using Bayesian logistic regression, my analysis of the territorial dispute claims from 1816 to 2001 confirms that weaker states are more likely to initiate territorial disputes if potential stronger target states have yielded in previous disputes, and if potential stronger target states are unlikely to encounter additional challengers in the future.

中文翻译：

---

较弱国家发起领土争端

虽然长期以来一直认为领土争端在国家间冲突研究中必不可少，但现有文献在很大程度上忽视了领土争端的真正开始。传统观点认为，鉴于争端升级对弱国的预期后果可能比强国更糟，前者发起争端的可能性应该小于后者。然而，很大一部分领土争端实际上是由较弱的国家发起的。为什么较弱的国家会对其相对较强的对手提出领土主张？从最近的国家间和国家内部冲突文献中关于声誉建立的工作中汲取见解，本文提供的解释侧重于信息和不确定性在引发领土争端中的作用。一个潜在的较弱的挑战国家对一个相对较强的国家发起领土争端的决定取决于关于潜在的更强大的目标是否在过去的争端中做出让步的信息，以及潜在的更强大的目标是否会在未来再次做出让步。未来。使用贝叶斯逻辑回归，我对 1816 年至 2001 年领土争端主张的分析证实，如果潜在的更强大的目标国在先前的争端中让步，并且如果潜在的更强大的目标国不太可能遇到额外的挑战者，则较弱的国家更有可能发起领土争端将来。一个潜在的较弱的挑战国家对一个相对较强的国家发起领土争端的决定取决于关于潜在的更强大的目标是否在过去的争端中做出让步的信息，以及潜在的更强大的目标是否会在未来再次做出让步。未来。使用贝叶斯逻辑回归，我对 1816 年至 2001 年领土争端主张的分析证实，如果潜在的更强大的目标国在先前的争端中让步，并且如果潜在的更强大的目标国不太可能遇到额外的挑战者，则较弱的国家更有可能发起领土争端将来。一个潜在的较弱的挑战国家对一个相对较强的国家发起领土争端的决定取决于关于潜在的更强大的目标是否在过去的争端中做出让步的信息，以及潜在的更强大的目标是否会在未来再次做出让步。未来。使用贝叶斯逻辑回归，我对 1816 年至 2001 年领土争端主张的分析证实，如果潜在的更强大的目标国在先前的争端中让步，并且如果潜在的更强大的目标国不太可能遇到额外的挑战者，则较弱的国家更有可能发起领土争端将来。