Since accounting conservatism is a measure of biased reporting which may or may not reflect high quality earnings, the relation between managerial ability and accounting conservatism is unclear ex ante. High-ability managers may report conservatively to improve the efficiency of contracts, avoid agency conflicts by the timely reporting of future losses, and build reputations for conservative reporting. Conversely, they may not report conservatively to the extent that conservatism reflects biased, and consequently, low-quality earnings. Motivated by these opposing arguments, we examine the relationship between managerial ability and conservatism for Australian firms for the period 2004 to 2013. Our results show that managerial ability is positively associated with accounting conservatism. These results support the notion that high ability managers apply conservatism in accounting because it benefits the firm and stakeholders. Our results are robust to a wide range of proxies for both managerial ability and conservatism, including the Heckman’s (1976) self-selection bias check. Our study should be of interest to numerous stakeholders, including firms seeking to make managerial appointments.

由于会计保守主义是一种偏见性报告的量度，可能反映或可能不反映高质量的收益，因此事前管理能力与会计保守主义之间的关系尚不清楚。高素质的经理可以保守地报告，以提高合同效率，通过及时报告未来损失来避免代理冲突，并建立保守报告的声誉。相反，他们可能不会保守地报告保守主义反映出有偏见的结果，因而反映了低质量的收益。基于这些相反的论点，我们考察了2004年至2013年澳大利亚公司的管理能力与保守主义之间的关系。我们的结果表明，管理能力与会计保守主义正相关。这些结果支持高能力管理者在会计中应用保守主义的观点，因为它有益于公司和利益相关者。我们的结果对于管理能力和保守主义的广泛代理都是可靠的，包括Heckman（1976）的自我选择偏差检查。我们的研究应该引起众多利益相关者的关注，包括寻求任命管理人员的公司。