Abstract

Contemporary property theory highlights information costs as the central determinant of exclusion rights and numerus clausus-type standardization: rising information costs lead to stronger exclusion rights and more standardization, whereas falling information costs have the opposite effect. This paradigmatic model lacks, however, a theory of how information costs change in the first place. By developing such a theory, this article demonstrates that, in prominent cases, the legal impact of information costs tends to be counterbalanced by concurrent changes in individual preference, and that preexisting predictions about the relationship between information costs, standardization, and exclusion are therefore partially wrong, and otherwise incomplete.

中文翻译：

---

信息成本之外：偏好形成与物权法架构

摘要

当代财产理论强调信息成本是排他性权利和克劳斯类型标准化的主要决定因素：信息成本上升导致排他权和标准化程度提高，而信息成本下降则产生相反的效果。但是，这种范例模型缺乏关于信息成本如何首先变化的理论。通过发展这种理论，本文证明，在特殊情况下，信息成本的法律影响往往会因个人偏好的同时变化而得到抵消，因此，关于信息成本，标准化和排除之间关系的先前预测是部分的错误，否则不完整。