Critics of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) have frequently claimed that it puts U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage. This critique suggests that the beneficiaries of FCPA enforcement are foreign competitors of U.S. firms, and foreign economies that suffer fewer of the inefficiencies associated with corruption. Yet enforcement of the Act has increased dramatically since it first passed in the post-Watergate, anti-corruption era. If the FCPA really promotes foreign interests over the interests of U.S. firms doing business abroad, and if there are no obvious domestic beneficiaries of aggressive enforcement, why have domestic business interests been unable to push back successfully against growing enforcement? This article suggests several reasons why the adverse effects of FCPA enforcement on U.S. business may be considerably smaller than some FCPA critics suggest, and why significant numbers of U.S. firms may actually benefit from enforcement. Our hypotheses find support in Congressional testimony, business surveys, and interviews with prominent FCPA practitioners and compliance officers. * Stanford University, Department of Political Science. ** Stanford Law School, 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, CA 94305. Email: asykes@law.stanford.edu. We thank Jack Goldsmith and Mike Tomz for preliminary conversations on this subject, Evan Epstein for extensive comments on an earlier draft, and two anonymous referees for useful suggestions on our revision. We also thank participants in the Duke Roundtable on Integrating Anti-Corruption into International Economic Law Scholarship and the Stanford Law School faculty workshop for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. During the course of our research, we have benefited enormously from extensive conversations with FCPA practitioners in law firms and in-house compliance attorneys, yielding insights that are scattered throughout this article, although generally without attribution by request. These individuals include Marcus Asner, Arnold and Porter Kaye Scholer; Brendan Cullen, Sullivan and Cromwell; Lucinda Low, Steptoe and Johnson and President of the American Society of International Law; Jodi Wu, Kirkland and Ellis; Adriaen Morse, formerly of CSRA; and Bruce Taten, formerly of Cooper Industries and Nabors Industries. We also thank Harold Kim and Page Faulk of the Institute for Legal Reform, U.S. Chamber of Commerce for helpful conversations and materials. Finally, we especially wish to thank John Bray at Control Risks for extensive discussions and for sharing the results of several Control Risks business surveys. The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business at Harvard Law School. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com doi:10.1093/jla/lay001 Advance Access published on March 23, 2018 D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /jla/article-act/9/2/153/4952051 by Snford M eical C eter user on 10 O cber 2018 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) creates an extensive network of obligations aimed at discouraging foreign bribery by firms subject to its jurisdiction. It criminalizes “willful” payments (including “anything of value”) to “foreign officials” made “corruptly” to obtain or retain business opportunities. It also creates elaborate accounting requirements to track foreign transactions, and includes provisions to encourage and reward whistleblowers. Potential liability exists for illicit payments by third-party contractors or intermediaries, and foreign subsidiaries. Successor liability can attach for prior illicit acts by acquired firms. Enforcement is divided between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Conventional accounts of the enactment of the FCPA portray it as a moralistic, post-Watergate reaction to the problem of corruption in government. A wide range of U.S. companies paid bribes to secure business abroad, the bribes were discovered, the companies were called on the carpet before Congress (Koehler 2012), and legislation followed soon. Congressional statements relating to the Act emphasized how bribery distorts resource allocation and can undermine U.S. foreign policy objectives (Church 1976). From the outset, however, a counter-narrative emphasized the possible risks to U.S. competitiveness from a policy of disabling U.S. firms from using a business tactic that their foreign competitors could still use freely. This concern yielded pressure on the U.S. government to soften the Act somewhat through 1988 amendments (Seitzinger 2016), to encourage foreign governments to adopt similar anti-bribery policies, and ultimately to the 1997 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) anti-bribery convention (Davis 2012 p. 502). It also fueled portions of the 1998 amendments to U.S. law that expanded the ability of U.S. enforcers to charge foreign corporations with bribery if the proscribed conduct has a U.S. nexus (often quite a modest one). Concerns about the Act’s impact on American competitiveness were dampened for many years, however, by the fact that enforcement was sparse. The first enforcement action came in 1978, with only 52 actions by the end of 2000 (Stanford Foreign Corrupt Practices Clearinghouse 2018, hereinafter SFCPAC 2018). But enforcement efforts expanded rapidly thereafter, with a total of 461 1 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. 2 See DOJ/SEC (2012) for a detailed discussion of the Act’s provisions and the agencies’ enforcement priorities. 3 See Crites (2012) and Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977 (1977) for further background. 4 See Bixby (2010). The act applies to U.S. nationals wherever located, to “issuers” who list securities on U.S. exchanges, and to “any person” acting within the United States. For the argument that the United States now exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction to an extent that clashes with customary international law, see Leibold (2014). 154 ~ Perlman and Sykes: Political Economy of the FCPA D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /jla/article-act/9/2/153/4952051 by Snford M eical C eter user on 10 O cber 2018 additional actions to date. The substantial uptick in enforcement began during the George W. Bush administration and accelerated during the Obama administration, with 2016 seeing more enforcement actions (55) than any prior year except 2010 (56). Enforcement has tailed off somewhat during the first year of the Trump administration, although 31 enforcement actions were initiated in 2017. The magnitude of enforcement penalties has also grown dramatically over time, with negligible monetary penalties imposed in the early years and a huge uptick beginning roughly a decade ago. Aggregate total sanctions are now approaching $11 billion (SFCPAC 2018). The growth in enforcement activity has turned FCPA investigation and compliance work into big business for major U.S. law firms and reignited concerns about an adverse impact on American business abroad. Segments of U.S. business continue to insist that the FCPA places them at an unacceptable competitive disadvantage, and calls to narrow or limit the Act’s scope and enforcement have come from entities such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Weissmann & Smith 2010) and an NYC Bar panel chaired by Jay Clayton, now the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (New York City Bar 2011). Among other things, advocates for reform have argued that enforcement of anti-bribery rules by foreign governments has been minimal notwithstanding the OECD convention (Brewster 2014). Collectively, these developments pose an intriguing political economy puzzle. The initial passage of the FCPA in the post-Watergate anti-corruption climate may be understandable despite the possible threat to U.S. business interests. But if the Act systematically harms American exporters and overseas investors, why have these seemingly well-organized domestic interests been unable to stem the rapid growth of enforcement decades later in Washington? While it is true that corruption causes inefficiency and waste, those costs are borne by the foreign economies that tolerate corruption. The only other obvious beneficiaries of aggressive enforcement are the foreign competitors of U.S firms that can continue to engage in bribery and secure more business opportunities as a result. A political equilibrium in Washington in which the economic interests of foreigners systematically win out over domestic interests seems mysterious. This article wrestles with various possible answers to the puzzle. Ultimately, we argue that the FCPA may not impose a large net burden on American business abroad. Critics of the FCPA are correct to say that enforcement can place U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage in securing business opportunities and that their next-best opportunities may well be less profitable in many instances. Yet, as we discuss more below, survey data and other evidence suggest that business opinions about the FCPA are quite divided regarding its impact. We offer four reasons why many firms may see significant benefits as well as costs associated with FCPA enforcement. Winter 2017: Volume 9, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 155 D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /jla/article-act/9/2/153/4952051 by Snford M eical C eter user on 10 O cber 2018 First, the standard business critique of the FCPA focuses on a loss of business opportunities ex ante. Firms competing for lucrative contracts with foreign governments, for example, lose out because they cannot make illicit payments to foreign officials who award such contracts. But if the FCPA makes

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《反海外腐败法》的政治经济学探析

对《反海外腐败法》（FCPA）的批评者经常声称，这使美国公司处于竞争劣势。这种批评表明，执行FCPA的受益者是美国公司的外国竞争者，而与腐败相关的效率低下的外国经济较少。但是，自从法案在水门事件发生后反腐败时代首次通过以来，该法案的执行量已大大增加。如果《反海外腐败法》真正促进了外国利益超过美国在国外开展业务的美国公司的利益，并且如果没有明显的国内积极执行的受益者，那么国内商业利益为何无法成功地反抗日益增长的执行力？本文提出了执行FCPA对美国不利影响的几个原因 业务可能比某些FCPA评论家建议的要小得多，以及为什么很多美国公司实际上可以从执法中受益。我们的假设在国会作证，商业调查以及与FCPA杰出从业人员和合规官的访谈中得到支持。*斯坦福大学政治学系。**斯坦福法学院（Stanford Law School），地址：559 Nathan Abbott Way斯坦福，CA94305。电子邮件：asykes@law.stanford.edu。我们感谢杰克·戈德史密斯（Jack Goldsmith）和迈克·汤姆斯（Mike Tomz）就此主题进行的初步交谈，埃文·爱泼斯坦（Evan Epstein）对较早的草案进行了广泛评论，并感谢两位匿名裁判对我们的修订提供有用的建议。我们还感谢将反腐败纳入国际经济法奖学金的杜克圆桌会议和斯坦福大学法学院教职人员研讨会对早期草案进行了深思熟虑的评论。在我们的研究过程中，我们与律师事务所的FCPA执业者和内部合规律师进行了广泛的交谈，从中受益匪浅，这些见解散布在整篇文章中，尽管通常不按要求提供。这些人包括Marcus Asner，Arnold和Porter Kaye Scholer；布伦丹·卡伦（Brendan Cullen），沙利文（Sullivan）和克伦威尔（Cromwell）；Lucinda Low，Steptoe和Johnson，美国国际法学会主席；吴迪（Jodi Wu），柯克兰（Kirkland）和埃利斯（Ellis）；前CSRA的Adriaen Morse；和布鲁斯·塔滕（Bruce Taten），前者是库珀工业公司（Cooper Industries）和纳博斯工业公司（Nabors Industries）。我们还要感谢美国商会法律改革研究所的Harold Kim和Page Faulk，他们提供了有益的对话和材料。最后，我们尤其要感谢Control Risks的John Bray进行了广泛的讨论并分享了一些Control Risks业务调查的结果。作者（2018年）。由牛津大学出版社代表哈佛大学法学院约翰·奥林法律，经济和商业中心出版。这是根据知识共享署名非商业许可（http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/）的条款分发的开放访问文章，该文章允许非商业性重用，分发和在适当引用原始作品的情况下，可以以任何媒体进行复制。对于商业重用，请联系journals.permissions@oup.com doi：10。1093 / jla / lay001 Advance Access已于2018年3月23日发布，网址为http：// academ ic.p.com/jla/article-act/9/2/153/4952051，作者是SnfordMéicalCeter用户，时间为10月2018年，《海外反腐败法》（FCPA）建立了广泛的义务网络，旨在阻止受其管辖​​的公司贿赂外国贿赂。它对向“腐败”获得或保留商业机会的“外国官员”“故意”付款（包括“任何有价值的东西”）定为犯罪。它还制定了详细的会计要求以跟踪国外交易，并包括鼓励和奖励举报人的条款。第三方承包商或中介机构以及外国子公司的非法付款存在潜在的责任。继任责任可归因于被收购公司先前的违法行为。执法部门分为司法部（DOJ）和证券交易委员会（SEC）。颁布FCPA的传统说法将其描绘为对政府腐败问题的道后水门行动。许多美国公司收受贿赂以确保在国外的业务，发现了贿赂，在国会面前将这些公司召唤到地毯上（Koehler 2012），并很快立法。国会有关该法案的声明强调了贿赂如何扭曲资源分配并破坏美国的外交政策目标（Church 1976）。然而，从一开始，一种反叙述就强调了一项政策，即禁止美国公司使用其外国竞争对手仍然可以自由使用的商业策略，这可能会损害美国竞争力。这种担忧向美国政府施加了压力，要求其通过1988年的修正案（Seitzinger，2016年）对法案进行一定程度的软化，以鼓励外国政府采取类似的反贿赂政策，并最终对1997年的经济合作与发展组织（OECD）实施反贿赂。公约》（戴维斯2012年第502页）。这也刺激了1998年美国法律修正案的部分内容，该修正案扩大了美国执法人员在被禁行为与美国有联系（通常相当适度）的情况下向外国公司收取贿赂的能力。多年来，由于该法案的执行稀少，人们对该法案对美国竞争力的影响的担忧得以缓解。第一次执法行动发生在1978年，到2000年底只有52项行动（斯坦福外国腐败行为资料交换所2018，以下简称SFCPAC 2018）。但是此后，执法工作迅速扩大，总共达到461 1 15 USC§§78dd-1等。2有关该法的规定和各机构执行重点的详细讨论，请参见DOJ / SEC（2012）。3有关更多背景信息，请参阅《 Crites（2012）和1977年的非法公司付款法》（1977）。4参见Bixby（2010）。该法案适用于美国国民，无论其身在何处，都适用于在美国交易所上市证券的“发行人”，以及适用于在美国境内行事的“任何人”。关于美国现在行使域外管辖权至与习惯国际法相抵触的论点，请参见Leibold（2014）。154〜Perlman和Sykes：《反海外腐败法》的政治经济学http：// academ ic.p.com / jla / article-act / 9/2/153/4952051由SnfordMéicalCeter用户于2018年10月10日附加迄今为止的行动。在乔治·W·布什（George W. Bush）执政期间开始了执法的大幅提高，而在奥巴马（Obama）政府期间则有所加快，2016年的执法行动（55）比除2010年（56）以外的任何一年都多。尽管在2017年发起了31次执法行动，但在特朗普政府执政的第一年，执法工作有所减少。随着时间的流逝，执法处罚的幅度也急剧增加，在早期实施的罚款金额可忽略不计，并且开始出现大幅上涨十年前。目前，制裁的总金额接近110亿美元（SFCPAC 2018）。执法活动的增加已将FCPA调查和合规工作变成了美国主要律师事务所的大笔生意，并再次引起了人们对其对美国海外业务产生不利影响的担忧。美国的细分 商业界继续坚持认为，FCPA将它们置于不可接受的竞争劣势之下，缩小或限制该法案范围和执行的呼吁来自诸如美国商会（Weissmann＆Smith，2010年）和由纽约市律师协会主持的实体。杰伊·克莱顿（Jay Clayton），现为美国证券交易委员会（SEC）主席（2011年，纽约市律师协会）。除其他外，改革的倡导者认为，尽管《经合组织公约》（Brewster，2014年），但外国政府对反贿赂规则的执行仍然很少。总的来说，这些事态发展构成了一个有趣的政治经济学难题。尽管可能会对美国商业利益造成威胁，但在水门事件后的反腐败环境中，FCPA的最初通过是可以理解的。但是，如果该法案系统性地损害了美国出口商和海外投资者，那么为什么这些看似井井有条的国内利益却无法阻止数十年后在华盛顿实施的迅速增长？腐败确实会导致效率低下和浪费，但这些成本是由容忍腐败的外国经济体承担的。积极执行的唯一其他明显受益者是美国公司的外国竞争者，他们可以继续从事贿赂并因此获得更多的商机。在华盛顿的政治平衡中，外国人的经济利益有计划地赢得国内利益似乎是神秘的。本文与难题的各种可能答案作斗争。最终，我们认为，《反海外腐败法》可能不会给美国在国外的业务造成太大的净负担。批评FCPA的人正确地说，执法可以使美国企业在获取商机时处于竞争劣势，并且在许多情况下，其次佳商机的获利能力可能很低。但是，正如我们在下面进行的更多讨论一样，调查数据和其他证据表明，关于FCPA的商业意见在影响方面存在很大分歧。我们提供了四个原因，为什么许多公司可能会看到与FCPA执法相关的巨大收益以及成本。2017年冬季：第9卷，第2期〜法律分析期刊〜155位来自SnfordMéicalCeter用户的http：// academ ic.p.com / jla / article-act / 9/2/153/4952051 2018年10月首先，FCPA的标准商业评论侧重于事前丧失商机。例如，与外国政府竞争有利可图的合同的公司之所以失败，是因为它们不能向授予此类合同的外国官员进行非法付款。但是如果《反海外腐败法》使