In ordinary life, people who assess other people’s assessments typically take into account the other judgments of those they are assessing in order to calibrate the judgment they are now assessing. The restaurant and hotel rating website TripAdvisor is exemplary, because it facilitates calibration by providing access to a rater’s previous ratings. This makes it possible to see whether a particular rating is coming from a rater who is enthusiastic about every place she patronizes, or from someone who is incessantly hard to please. And even when less systematized, as with the assessment of a letter of recommendation or a college transcript, calibration by recourse to the decisional history of those whose judgments we are assessing is a ubiquitous feature of ordinary life. Yet despite the ubiquity and utility of such calibration, the legal system seems perversely to reject it. Appellate courts do not openly adjust their standard of review based on the previous judgments of the judge whose decision they are reviewing, nor do judges who review legislative or administrative decisions, magistrates who evaluate search warrant representations, and even jurors who assess witness perception. In most legal domains, calibration by reference to the other decisions of the judgment being reviewed is invisible, either because it does not exist or because what reviewing bodies know informally is not something they are willing to admit to using. Appellate courts do not, at least openly, look more carefully at the decisions of a trial judge whose decisions are often reversed, and administrative law judges do not acknowledge examining the decisions of some administrators more closely because of what they know about the decisional history of that administrator. However common it is for ordinary people to attempt to calibrate the decisions of those on whom they rely, the law generally resists such calibration, implicitly prohibiting access to a reviewee’s decisional history and discouraging publicly acknowledging that a decisional history has played a role in a reviewer’s decision. Assisted by insights from cognitive psychology and philosophy, this Article examines law’s seeming aversion to calibration, and to explore what this aversion says about the nature of law and legal decision-making.

中文翻译：

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校准法律判决

在日常生活中，评估他人评估的人通常会考虑他们正在评估的人的其他判断，以便校准他们现在正在评估的判断。餐馆和酒店评分网站TripAdvisor堪称典范，因为它通过提供对评分者以前评分的访问来促进校准。这样就可以查看某个特定的评级是来自对她所光顾的每个地方都充满热情的评级者，还是来自一个难以取悦的人。甚至在系统化程度较低的情况下（例如对推荐信或大学成绩单的评估），依靠我们正在评估其判断的人的决策历史来进行校准也是普通生活中普遍存在的特征。尽管这种校准无处不在且有用，法律制度似乎反对它。上诉法院不会根据正在审查其决定的法官的先前判断公开调整其审查标准，也不会审查立法或行政决定的法官，评估搜查令陈述的裁判官，甚至是评估证人感知的陪审员。在大多数法律领域中，参考被复核判决的其他决定进行标定是不可见的，这可能是因为它不存在，或者是因为复核机构非正式地知道不是他们愿意使用的东西。上诉法院至少在公开场合不会更仔细地看待往往会推翻判决的初审法官的判决，行政法法官不承认更仔细地检查某些管理员的决策，因为他们了解该管理员的决策历史。普通人尝试校准他们所依赖的人的决定是多么普遍，法律通常会拒绝这种校准，暗中禁止访问被审核者的决定历史，并公开劝阻承认决定历史在审核者的决定中起作用决定。在认知心理学和哲学的见解的帮助下，本文研究了法律似乎对定标的厌恶，并探讨了这种厌恶对法律和法律决策的本质的看法。普通人尝试校准他们所依赖的人的决定是多么普遍，法律通常会拒绝这种校准，暗中禁止访问被审核者的决定历史，并公开劝阻承认决定历史在审核者的决定中发挥了作用决定。在认知心理学和哲学的见解的帮助下，本文研究了法律对标定的看似厌恶，并探讨了这种厌恶对法律的本质和法律决策的影响。普通人尝试校准他们所依赖的人的决定是多么普遍，法律通常会拒绝这种校准，暗中禁止访问被审核者的决定历史，并公开劝阻承认决定历史在审核者的决定中起作用决定。在认知心理学和哲学的见解的帮助下，本文研究了法律似乎对定标的厌恶，并探讨了这种厌恶对法律和法律决策的本质的看法。