This paper clarifies why optimal corporate governance generally excludes monetary liability for breach of directors' and managers' fiduciary duty of care. In principle, payments predicated on judicial evaluations of directors' and managers' business decisions could usefully supplement payments predicated on stock prices or accounting figures in the provision of performance incentives. In particular, the optimally adjusted combination of standard performance pay and tailored partial liability could impose less risk on directors and managers, and provide better risk-taking incentives, than standard performance pay alone. This paper shows this in a formal model summarizing well-known results.Consequently, the reason not to use liability incentives is not absolute but a cost-benefit trade-off. Litigation is expensive, while the benefits from refining incentives are limited, at least in public firms. Equity pay already provides fairly good incentives, courts have difficulties evaluating business decisions, and the agency conflict in standard business decisions is limited. The analysis rationalizes many existing exceptions from non-liability but also leads to novel recommendations, particularly for entities other than public corporations.

中文翻译：

---

违反护理义务的金钱责任？

本文阐明了为什么最佳公司治理通常会排除由于违反董事和经理的信托义务而产生的货币责任。原则上，以对董事和经理的业务决策进行司法评估为基础的报酬，可以有效地补充以股票价格或会计数字为基础的报酬，以提供绩效激励。尤其是，标准绩效薪酬与量身定制的部分责任的最佳调整组合可以给董事和经理带来更少的风险，并提供比单独的标准绩效薪酬更好的冒险动机。本文在总结众所周知结果的正式模型中对此进行了说明。因此，不使用责任激励的原因不是绝对的，而是成本效益的权衡。诉讼很昂贵 尽管提炼激励措施的收益是有限的，至少在上市公司中是如此。股本报酬已经提供了相当不错的激励措施，法院在评估业务决策时遇到了困难，并且代理机构在标准业务决策中的冲突非常有限。分析合理化了许多现有的非责任性例外，但也提出了新颖的建议，尤其是对于非公共公司的实体。