U.S. corporate criminal enforcement policy encourages prosecutors to enter into deferred and non-prosecution agreements (D/NPAs) that impose corporate reform mandates on firms with detected misconduct. This article concludes that the process governing prosecutors’ use of D/NPA mandates is inconsistent with the rule of law. The rule of law requires that individual executive branch actors not be given sufficient authority to restrict the rights of others to achieve personal aims, including idiosyncratic conceptions of the public interest. To satisfy the rule of law, modern governments granting discretion to executive branch actors constrain this authority by both limiting the scope of authority granted and requiring external oversight of decisions. Formal enforcement through pleas and formal agency rule-making employ both mechanisms. By contrast, prosecutors who use D/NPAs to create and impose new duties face few limitations on either the scope of their ex ante authority to intervene. They also face little oversight through judicial review. This broad grant of discretion to individual prosecutors’ offices is inconsistent with the rule of law.

中文翻译：

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超越法治的起诉：通过延期起诉协议施加的公司授权

美国公司刑事执法政策鼓励检察官订立延期和不起诉协议（D / NPA），这些协议将法人改革的强制性规定施加于发现不当行为的公司。本文的结论是，指导检察官使用D / NPA任务的程序与法治不一致。法治要求不授予个人行政部门行为者足够的权力，以限制他人实现个人目标的权利，包括对公共利益的特殊概念。为了满足法治，现代政府授予行政部门行为者酌处权，既限制了授权范围，又要求外部监督决策，从而限制了这一权力。通过请求的正式执行和正式的机构规则制定都采用了两种机制。相比之下，使用D / NPA制定和施加新职责的检察官在事前干预权限的范围上几乎没有限制。他们也几乎没有受到司法审查的监督。授予检察官办公室广泛的酌处权与法治相抵触。