It is orthodox doctrine that international law includes no general prohibition on instigation in the law of state responsibility – the rule in Article 16 ARSIWA is taken only to capture material assistance (or facilitation) as opposed to the ways that a state might induce or incite or instigate another state to commit a wrongful act. This orthodox conclusion is based on three claims – two conceptual and one founded on the absence of state practice. I argue that the two conceptual claims are flawed. In contrast, it is probably correct that there is insufficient state practice to ground a prohibition on instigation. However, in this article I argue that such a prohibition may instead be grounded on a general principle of law as envisaged in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ. That general principle may be formulated in the following way: it is wrong to instigate another to do what you cannot do yourself. To this end, the inquiry seeks to show that, as the ICTY put it in Tadic, ‘the major legal systems of the world take the same approach to this notion.’ Crucially, its comparative analysis is not based on criminal law, even though instigation is widely accepted there – the jump from a general principle of criminal liability to a rule of state responsibility might be thought too wide. Instead, I seek to show is that this general principle is instantiated in civil law in the major legal systems of the world.Of course, it is not enough to show that a general principle exists in those major legal systems – the consequent question is whether it is appropriate for the international legal system and its community of sovereign states. I argue that it is, and simultaneously address the proposed content of that principle when instantiated in international law. Indeed, it will be argued that now that international law has taken the radical leap represented by the rule in Article 16 ARSIWA, it makes no sense to exclude instigation from the ambit of the rule. In addition to its grounding in positive law through Article 38(1)(c), a prohibition on instigation is compelled by the essential logic of Article 16 ARSIWA and the moral claim of complicity: you cannot do by another what you cannot do yourself.

中文翻译：

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国际法中的国家煽动：一般原则的转换

国际法在国家责任法中不包含对煽动的普遍禁止是正统学说——ARSIWA 第 16 条中的规则仅用于获取物质援助（或便利），而不是一国可能诱导或煽动或煽动或煽动的方式。教唆另一个国家实施不法行为。这个正统的结论基于三个主张——两个是概念性的，一个是建立在缺乏国家实践的基础上的。我认为这两个概念上的主张是有缺陷的。相比之下，没有足够的国家实践来禁止煽动，这可能是正确的。然而，在本文中，我认为这种禁止可能基于《国际法院规约》第 38 条第 1 款 (c) 项所设想的一般法律原则。该一般原则可以用以下方式表述：鼓动别人做你自己不能做的事情是错误的。为此，调查试图表明，正如前南问题国际法庭在 Tadic 中所说的那样，“世界上的主要法律体系对这个概念采取了相同的方法”。至关重要的是，它的比较分析并非基于刑法，尽管煽动在那里被广泛接受——从刑事责任的一般原则到国家责任规则的跳跃可能被认为过于宽泛。相反，我试图表明的是，这一普遍原则在世界主要法律体系中的民法中得到了实例化。当然，仅仅表明这些主要法律体系中存在普遍原则是不够的——随之而来的问题是它适用于国际法律体系及其主权国家共同体。我认为它是，并同时处理在国际法中实例化的该原则的拟议内容。确实，有人会争辩说，既然国际法已经采取了 ARSIWA 第 16 条中的规则所代表的根本性飞跃，将煽动排除在该规则的范围之外是没有意义的。除了通过第 38(1)(c) 条以实在法为基础之外，禁止煽动还受到第 16 条 ARSIWA 的基本逻辑和同谋的道德主张的强制要求：你不能让别人做你自己不能做的事。