This paper investigates the stability of the efficient cartel mechanism in a sealed-bid first-price auction. We find that even if bidders are not informed about who else participates in the auction when they submit bids, the cartel is not stable. Hence, the instability of cartels does not hinge on the information structure imposed on the bidders. A seller does not have to reveal who participates in the auction to prevent them from forming a cartel.

中文翻译：

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不知情的竞标者在第一次价格拍卖中有效卡特尔机制的稳定性

本文研究了密封卡式一级价格拍卖中有效卡特尔机制的稳定性。我们发现，即使投标人在提交投标书时未获悉还有谁参加了拍卖，卡特尔也不稳定。因此，卡特尔的不稳定性并不取决于强加于投标人的信息结构。卖方不必透露谁参加了拍卖就可以防止他们形成卡特尔。