We study how policy choice and political selection are affected by the concentration of political power. In a setting with inefficient policy gambles, variations in power concentration give rise to a trade-off. On the one hand, power-concentrating institutions allocate more power to the voters’ preferred candidate. On the other hand, they induce the adoption of more overly risky policies and decrease the voters’ capability to select well-suited politicians. We show that full concentration of power is optimal if and only if the conflict of interest between voters and politicians is small. Otherwise, an intermediate level of power concentration is optimal.

中文翻译：

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政治选择与政治权力的最佳集中

我们研究政治权力集中如何影响政策选择和政治选择。在政策赌博效率低下的情况下，功率集中度的变化会导致权衡取舍。一方面，权力集中机构将更多权力分配给选民的首选候选人。另一方面，它们诱使采用风险更大的政策，并降低了选民选择合适的政治人物的能力。我们展示力量，充分浓度是最佳的当且仅当的选民和政治家之间的利益冲突是很小的。否则，功率集中的中间水平是最佳的。