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The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law
American Business Law Journal ( IF 1.3 ) Pub Date : 2020-03-18 , DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12155
Kenneth Khoo , Jerrold Soh

It is well understood that the exchange of information between horizontal competitors can violate competition law provisions in both the European Union (EU) and the United States, namely, article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, despite ostensible similarities between EU and U.S. antitrust law concerning interfirm information exchange, substantial differences remain. In this article, we make a normative argument for the U.S. antitrust regime's approach, on the basis that the United States’ approach to information exchange is likely to be more efficient than the relevant approach under the EU competition regime. Using economic theories of harm concerning information exchange to understand the imposition of liability in relation to “stand‐alone” instances of information exchange, we argue that such liability must be grounded on the conception of a prophylactic rule. We characterize this rule as a form of ex ante regulation and explain why it has no ex post counterpart in antitrust law. In contrast to the U.S. antitrust regime, we argue that the implementation of such a rule pursuant to EU competition law leads to higher error costs without a significant reduction in regulatory costs. As a majority of jurisdictions have competition law regimes that resemble EU competition law more closely than U.S. antitrust law, our thesis has important implications for competition regimes around the world.

中文翻译:

准Per Se规则的效率低:欧盟和美国反托拉斯法中的信息交换

众所周知,横向竞争者之间的信息交流可能会违反欧盟和美国的竞争法规定,即《欧洲联盟功能条约》第101条和《谢尔曼法》第1条法案。但是,尽管欧盟和美国关于企业间信息交换的反托拉斯法在表面上有相似之处,但仍然存在很大差异。在本文中,我们对美国的反托拉斯制度的做法进行了规范性的论证,其依据是,美国的信息交换办法可能比欧盟竞争制度下的相关办法更有效率。使用关于信息交换的损害的经济理论来理解对“独立”信息交换实例施加的赔偿责任,我们认为,这种赔偿责任必须以预防规则的概念为基础。我们将此规则描述为事前监管的一种形式,并解释了为什么它在反托拉斯法中没有事后对应。与美国的反托拉斯制度相反,我们认为,根据欧盟竞争法实施此类规则会导致较高的错误成本,而不会显着降低监管成本。由于大多数司法管辖区的竞争法制度都比美国反托拉斯法更类似于欧盟竞争法,因此我们的论文对全球竞争制度具有重要意义。我们认为,此类责任必须基于预防性规则的概念。我们将此规则描述为事前监管的一种形式,并解释了为什么它在反托拉斯法中没有事后对应。与美国的反托拉斯制度相反,我们认为,根据欧盟竞争法实施此类规则会导致较高的错误成本,而不会显着降低监管成本。由于大多数司法管辖区的竞争法制度都比美国反托拉斯法更类似于欧盟竞争法,因此我们的论文对全球竞争制度具有重要意义。我们认为,这种责任必须基于预防性规则的概念。我们将此规则描述为事前监管的一种形式,并解释了为什么它在反托拉斯法中没有事后对应。与美国的反托拉斯制度相反,我们认为,根据欧盟竞争法实施此类规则会导致较高的错误成本,而不会显着降低监管成本。由于大多数司法管辖区的竞争法制度都比美国反托拉斯法更类似于欧盟竞争法,因此我们的论文对全球竞争制度具有重要意义。我们认为,根据欧盟竞争法执行此类规则会导致较高的错误成本,而不会显着降低监管成本。由于大多数司法管辖区的竞争法制度都比美国反托拉斯法更类似于欧盟竞争法,因此我们的论文对全球竞争制度具有重要意义。我们认为,根据欧盟竞争法执行此类规则会导致较高的错误成本,而不会显着降低监管成本。由于大多数司法管辖区的竞争法制度都比美国反托拉斯法更类似于欧盟竞争法,因此我们的论文对全球竞争制度具有重要意义。
更新日期:2020-03-18
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