Along with adverse selection, moral hazard is one of the major hurdles that private and public insurance plans must contend with. Moral hazard occurs if risks are endogenous to a producer's behavior and if the insurer is unable to properly monitor the insured. We review the role of moral hazard in the US crop insurance program. We conduct an empirical analysis of one important aspect of the US crop insurance program—prevented planting. This provision provides indemnity payments if conditions are not suitable for planting. The program has been the subject of considerable controversy, especially during 2019, when the rate of claims is expected to be especially high. Because loss adjustors may encounter difficulties in assessing the weather conditions associated with prevented planting claims, the program is susceptible to moral hazard. We consider the extent to which prevented planting claims may be endogenous to prices. We find significant evidence of moral hazard. The likelihood of prevented planting claims increases as the expected market price decreases or as fertilizer costs increase for corn and soybeans in the Prairie Pothole Region and for grain sorghum and cotton in all states.

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道德风险和补贴农作物保险

除了逆向选择之外，道德风险也是私人和公共保险计划必须应对的主要障碍之一。如果风险是生产者行为的内生因素，并且保险人无法正确监控被保险人，则会发生道德风险。我们回顾了道德风险在美国作物保险计划中的作用。我们对美国作物保险计划的一个重要方面进行了实证分析，即防止播种。如果条件不适合播种，该规定将提供赔偿金。该计划一直是一个备受争议的主题，尤其是在2019年，预计索赔率会特别高。由于损失理算人在评估与防止播种要求有关的天气条件时可能会遇到困难，因此该程序容易受到道德风险的影响。我们认为阻止播种权的范围可能是价格的内生因素。我们发现有道德风险的重要证据。随着预期市场价格下降或大草原坑洼地区玉米和大豆以及所有州谷物高粱和棉花的化肥成本增加，被阻止播种的可能性增加。