重新审视道义论与功利主义在道德困境判断中的鸿沟：一种多项建模方法。,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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重新审视道义论与功利主义在道德困境判断中的鸿沟：一种多项建模方法。
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ( IF 6.4 ) Pub Date : 2020-01-01 , DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000173
Max Hennig ₁ , Mandy Hütter ₁

Affiliation

我们借助多项式处理树模型研究了道德困境判断的心理基础，并考虑了如何最好地概念化困境判断的决定因素。我们认为，出于概念和经验上的原因，规范和结果应被视为彼此之间更加紧密的联系，而不是两难研究中的系统并置可能暗示，并建议也应从结果论的角度看待规范认可。。为了研究该提议，我们介绍了道德困境判断的CNI模型的变体，该模型仅侧重于使用规范性规范。在五个实验中，我们验证了此proCNI模型并评估了参数对不同类型后果和个人参与的敏感性。我们的发现表明，代表“规范”的参数也对后果敏感，因此，除非期望规范会产生切实的后果，否则规范不会指导道德判断。因此，目前的研究表明，准则和作为决定因素的“后果”（或“道义论”和“功利主义”）之间的分裂是人为的。我们建议，最终，通过结果论者的角度查看困境的判断可能是推进困境研究领域的理论发展的有用方法。（PsycINFO数据库记录（c）2019 APA，保留所有权利）。目前的研究表明，准则和“后果”（或“道义论”和“功利主义”）之间的划分是人为的。我们建议，最终，通过结果论者的角度查看困境的判断可能是推进困境研究领域的理论发展的有用方法。（PsycINFO数据库记录（c）2019 APA，保留所有权利）。目前的研究表明，准则和“后果”（或“道义论”和“功利主义”）之间的划分是人为的。我们建议，最终，通过结果论者的角度查看困境的判断可能是推进困境研究领域的理论发展的有用方法。（PsycINFO数据库记录（c）2019 APA，保留所有权利）。

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Revisiting the divide between deontology and utilitarianism in moral dilemma judgment: A multinomial modeling approach.

We investigate the psychological bases underlying moral dilemma judgment with the help of multinomial processing tree modeling, and consider how determinants of dilemma judgment should best be conceptualized. We argue that, for conceptual as well as empirical reasons, norms and consequences should be considered as more intimately linked with one another than their systematic juxtaposition in dilemma research may suggest, and propose that norm-endorsement should be viewed through a consequentialist lens as well. Investigating this proposal, we introduce a variant of the CNI model of moral dilemma judgment, which focuses on the use of proscriptive norms only. In five experiments, we validate this proCNI model and assess the parameters' sensitivity to different types of consequences and personal involvement. Our findings suggest that the parameter representing "norms" is sensitive to consequences as well, such that norms do not guide moral judgment unless they are expected to produce tangible consequences. Thus, present research suggests that the split between norms and "consequences" (or "deontology" and "utilitarianism") as determinants of judgment is artificial. We suggest that, ultimately, viewing dilemma judgments through a consequentialist lens may be a useful approach for advancing theoretical development in the field of dilemma research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

更新日期：2020-01-01

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