Previous studies indicate that prior period investor protection, quality of government/institution and ownership have little to no influence on bank risk-taking around crisis periods. Using contemporaneous data for 40 countries, we show that institutional mechanisms, investor protection, bank regulation and supervision (BRS) rules, and ownership, reduced bank risk-taking around the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Eurozone Crisis/Sovereign Debt Crisis periods. Institutional mechanisms have the strongest risk-reducing impacts on bank risk-taking, whereas foreign and government ownership have the weakest impacts. The greater the distance from bank default the lower the likelihood of crisis regimes. Investor protection increased (decreased) the likelihood of the GFC (Eurozone Crisis) regimes. Government ownership increased (decreased) the likelihood of the GFC (Eurozone Crisis) regimes. Using a generalized bivariate copula function, we untangle the relation between crisis regimes and bank risk-taking by showing that higher risk-taking increases the likelihood of crisis regimes.

中文翻译：

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危机期间的体制机制、所有权和银行风险承担


先前的研究表明，前期投资者保护、政府/机构质量和所有权对危机时期的银行风险承担几乎没有影响。使用 40 个国家/地区的同期数据，我们表明，在全球金融危机 （GFC） 和欧元区危机/主权债务危机期间，制度机制、投资者保护、银行监管和监督 （BRS） 规则以及所有权减少了银行承担风险。制度机制对银行风险承担的降低风险影响最大，而外资和政府所有权的影响最小。与银行违约的距离越大，危机发生的可能性就越低。投资者保护增加了（减少）GFC（欧元区危机）制度的可能性。政府所有权增加（减少）GFC（欧元区危机）制度的可能性。使用广义二元 copula 函数，我们通过证明较高的风险承担会增加危机机制的可能性来解开危机机制和银行风险承担之间的关系。