Do non-human animals have moral standing? Work on this question has focused on choosing the right grounding property (for example, personhood or sentience) while little attention has been paid to the various ways that the connection between grounding properties and moral standing has been explained. In this paper, I address that gap by offering a fresh way to approach the debate over the grounds of moral standing, including a novel taxonomy of positions, and argue that one kind of position, which takes a ‘value-first’ approach, is preferable to the other, which takes an ‘interests-first’ approach. According to value-first accounts, some individuals have moral standing because they have properties that make them valuable. According to interests-first accounts, some individuals have moral standing because they have interests, and any interest must always be taken into account. I argue that we should prefer value-first accounts because they engage directly with the problem the concept of moral standing is employed to solve, and because interests-first accounts cannot meet their explanatory burdens without begging the question against value-first accounts.

非人类动物有道德地位吗？这个问题的工作集中在选择正确的接地特性（例如，人格或感知力），而很少关注解释接地特性和道德地位之间联系的各种方式。在本文中，我通过提供一种新的方法来处理关于道德地位基础的辩论，包括一种新的立场分类法，并认为一种采取“价值优先”方法的立场优于另一种采取“利益优先”方法的立场。根据价值优先的说法，一些人具有道德地位，因为他们拥有使他们有价值的属性。根据利益优先的说法，有些人之所以具有道德地位，是因为他们有利益，任何利益都必须始终被考虑在内。我认为我们应该更喜欢价值优先的账户，因为它们直接涉及道德地位概念所要解决的问题，而且因为利益优先的账户如果不提出反对价值优先账户的问题，就无法满足它们的解释负担。