Marketing to investors – especially when seeking funding for start-ups – is unique, with investors facing extreme uncertainty. This study uses foundational work in marketing, economics, management, finance, and psychology, as well as theories-in-use development with angel and VC investors to build a Business-to-Investor (B2I) Marketing theory. The theory proposes that investors rely on marketing signals from start-ups’ whether they are costly (financial, social, human, and intellectual resource endowments) or costless (verbal passion and concreteness). Results of a large quantitative field study of 5,334 written proposals from start-ups show that costly and costless signals have interactive effects on investor acceptance. The natural entrepreneurial tendency to compensate for a lack of costly signals with the use of passionate language backfires, reducing investor acceptance. Only when there is a number of costly signals communicated does a greater use of passion increase investor acceptance. Further, written proposals should be moderately concrete when they lack costly signals and should be formulated abstractly when plenty of costly signals can be offered. These contingencies provide insights into costly-costless signal interdependence in B2I marketing and suggest how start-ups can optimize their written proposals for investor acceptance.

中文翻译：

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EXPRESS：企业对投资者 (B2I) 营销：昂贵和无成本信号的相互作用


对投资者的营销——尤其是在为初创企业寻求资金时——是独一无二的，因为投资者面临着极大的不确定性。本研究利用市场营销、经济学、管理学、金融和心理学方面的基础工作，以及与天使和风险投资者一起开发的理论，构建了企业对投资者 (B2I) 营销理论。该理论认为，投资者依赖于初创企业的营销信号，无论这些信号是昂贵的（财务、社会、人力和智力资源禀赋）还是无成本的（言语热情和具体）。对来自初创企业的 5,334 份书面提案进行的大规模定量实地研究的结果表明，有成本和无成本的信号对投资者的接受程度具有交互作用。企业家自然倾向于用热情的语言来弥补代价高昂的信号的缺乏，但结果却适得其反，降低了投资者的接受度。只有当传达了许多代价高昂的信号时，更多地运用热情才能提高投资者的接受度。此外，当缺乏昂贵的信号时，书面提案应该适度具体；当可以提供大量昂贵的信号时，书面提案应该抽象地制定。这些意外事件提供了对 B2I 营销中高成本与无成本信号相互依赖性的见解，并建议初创企业如何优化其书面提案以供投资者接受。