When accepting an axiomatic theory S, we are implicitly committed to various statements that are independent of its axioms. Examples of such implicit commitments include consistency statements and reflection principles for S. While foundational acceptance has received considerable attention in this context, the study of implicit commitments triggered by weaker notions remains underdeveloped. This article extends the analysis investigating implicit commitments inherent in instrumental acceptance, comparing them with the implicit commitments involved in foundational acceptance. Concentrating on Reinhardt’s instrumentalism vis-à-vis Kripke–Feferman theory of truth as a case study, we present a number of formal theories of acceptance motivated by Reinhardt’s program and we analyze their properties. We argue that, under reasonable assumptions, instrumental acceptance does entail non-trivial implicit commitments, yet weaker than those associated with foundational acceptance.

中文翻译：

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工具性接受的隐性承诺：案例研究


当接受公理理论 S 时，我们隐含地致力于独立于其公理的各种陈述。这种隐性承诺的例子包括 S 的一致性陈述和反思原则。虽然基本接受在这方面受到了相当大的关注，但对由较弱概念引发的隐性承诺的研究仍然不发达。本文扩展了对工具性接受中固有的隐性承诺的分析，并将其与基础性接受中涉及的隐性承诺进行了比较。我们以莱因哈特的工具主义与克里普克-费弗曼真理理论为案例研究，提出了一些受莱因哈特纲领启发的正式接受理论，并分析了它们的性质。我们认为，在合理的假设下，工具性接受确实需要不平凡的隐性承诺，但比与基础性接受相关的承诺要弱。