When does a model explain? When does it promote understanding? A dominant approach to scientific explanation is the interventionist view. According to this view, when X explains Y, intervening on X can produce, prevent or alter Y in some predictable way. In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, I reject a position that many interventionist theorists endorse. This position is that to explain some phenomenon by providing a model is also to understand that phenomenon. While endorsing the interventionist view, I argue that explaining and understanding are distinct scientific achievements. Second, I defend a novel theory of scientific understanding. According to this view, when some model M promotes understanding, M makes available a distinctive mental state. This state is of the same psychological kind as when we grasp events in a narrative as bearing on some ultimate conclusion. To conclude, I show that, given this view, mechanistic explanations often provide a powerful source of understanding that many causal-historical models lack. This paper will be of interest to both philosophers of science and epistemologists engaged in the topics of sexplanation and understanding.

模型什么时候解释？什么时候可以促进理解？科学解释的主要方法是干预主义观点。根据这种观点，当X解释Y时，对X的干预可以以某种可预测的方式产生、阻止或改变Y。在本文中，我提出两个主张。首先，我拒绝许多干预主义理论家赞同的立场。这个立场是，通过提供模型来解释某种现象也是为了理解这种现象。在赞同干预主义观点的同时，我认为解释和理解是不同的科学成就。其次，我捍卫一种新颖的科学理解理论。根据这一观点，当某种模型 M 促进理解时，M 就提供了一种独特的心理状态。这种状态与我们将叙事中的事件理解为与某些最终结论有关时的心理状态相同。总而言之，我表明，鉴于这种观点，机械解释通常提供了许多因果历史模型所缺乏的强大理解来源。本文将引起从事性解释和理解主题的科学哲学家和认识论者的兴趣。