This paper develops a novel conception of freedom of thought as the right to epistemic self‐realization. The recognition of this right is characterized here as a modally robust normative status that I think one has as a potential knower in an epistemic community. It is a status that one cannot enjoy without a specific form of institutionalized intellectual respect and support. To explain and defend this conception of freedom of thought, it is contrasted here with more traditionally “negative” conceptions of freedom of thought, in terms of not being interfered with. It is also contrasted here with a “positive” conception of freedom of thought derived from a recently prominent account of doxastic agency as grounded in the rational capacity to self‐determine one's own response to reasons. In both cases, the crux of the argument in this paper is that a conception of freedom of thought as a right to epistemic self‐realization makes better sense of why we fear the counter‐liberatory forces of propaganda and regulated thinking, and also why we hold out hope for the liberating potential of education and critical engagement with expertise in the public sphere.

中文翻译：

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 思想自由


本文提出了一种新的思想自由概念，即认知自我实现的权利。对这一权利的承认在这里被描述为一种模态稳健的规范状态，我认为一个人作为认知界中的潜在知识者具有这种状态。如果没有特定形式的制度化智力尊重和支持，一个人就无法享有这种地位。为了解释和捍卫这种思想自由的概念，这里将其与更传统的“消极”思想自由概念（即不受干扰）进行了对比。这里它也与思想自由的“积极”概念形成鲜明对比，该概念源自最近对信念代理的著名描述，认为信念代理的基础是自我决定自己对原因的反应的理性能力。在这两种情况下，本文论点的关键在于，将思想自由视为一种认识上的自我实现的权利，可以更好地理解为什么我们害怕宣传和规范思维的反解放力量，以及为什么我们对教育的解放潜力和公共领域专业知识的批判性参与抱有希望。