In this paper, I consider the potential implications of the observation that epistemic judgment seems to be less emotional than moral judgment. I argue that regardless of whether emotions are necessary for blame, blaming emotions do play an important epistemic role in the moral domain. They allow us to grasp propositions about moral blameworthiness and thereby to appreciate their significance in a special way. Further, I argue that if we generally lack blaming emotions in the epistemic domain, then we are unable to grasp propositions about epistemic blameworthiness. As a result, regardless of one's theory of epistemic blame, there emerges a tension between the claims that we are epistemically blameworthy for our epistemic failings and the claim that we do not feel epistemic blaming emotions.

中文翻译：

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情绪和对认知责任的非凡把握


在本文中，我考虑了认知判断似乎不如道德判断那么情绪化的观察结果的潜在含义。我认为，无论责备情绪是否是必要的，责备情绪确实在道德领域发挥着重要的认知作用。它们使我们能够掌握有关道德应受谴责的命题，从而以特殊的方式理解它们的重要性。此外，我认为，如果我们在认知领域普遍缺乏责备情绪，那么我们就无法掌握有关认知责备的命题。结果，无论一个人的认知责备理论如何，在“我们对自己的认知失败在认知上应受责备”这一主张与“我们没有感受到认知责备情绪”的主张之间，出现了一种紧张关系。