This article provides a new account of how moral beliefs can be epistemically justified. I argue that we should take seriously the hypothesis that the human mind contains emotion-enriched moral perceptions, i.e. perceptual experiences as of moral properties, arising from cognitive penetration by emotions. Further, I argue that if this hypothesis is true, then such perceptual experiences can provide regress-stopping justification for moral beliefs. Emotion-enriched moral perceptions do exhibit a kind of epistemic dependence: they can only justify moral beliefs if the emotions from which they arise are themselves justified. However, to have a justified emotion, one only needs (1) to possess some non-moral information and (2) to respond fittingly to this information. Neither (1) nor (2) requires one to possess any justification for moral beliefs antecedently, so emotion-enriched moral perceptions can halt the regress of moral justification.

中文翻译：

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情感丰富的道德感知


本文提供了关于如何在认识论上证明道德信念合理性的新解释。我认为，我们应该认真对待这样的假设：人类心灵包含情感丰富的道德感知，即道德属性的感知体验，源于情感的认知渗透。此外，我认为，如果这个假设是正确的，那么这种感知体验可以为道德信仰提供阻止倒退的理由。富含情感的道德观念确实表现出一种认知依赖性：只有当道德信念产生的情感本身是合理的时，它们才能证明道德信念的合理性。然而，要拥有一种合理的情绪，一个人只需要（1）拥有一些非道德信息，以及（2）对这些信息做出适当的反应。 （1）和（2）都不要求一个人事先拥有道德信念的任何正当理由，因此，情感丰富的道德感知可以阻止道德正当性的倒退。