Subjectivists about practical normativity hold that an agent's favouring and disfavouring attitudes give rise to practical reasons. On this view, an agent's normative reason to choose vanilla over chocolate ice cream ultimately turns on facts about what appeals to her rather than facts about what her options are like attitude-independently. Objectivists—who ground reasons in the attitude-independent features of the things we aim at—owe us an explanation of why it is rational to choose what we favour, if not simply because favouring is a source of reasons. My aim in this paper is to supply such a story. The proposal is roughly that when an agent cannot base her choices on her judgements about what she has most reason to do, structural rationality extends to her a license to choose something simply because she favours it, without imbuing favouring with the authority of a normative reason.

中文翻译：

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 当理由耗尽时


关于实践规范性的主观主义者认为，主体的赞成和反对态度会产生实际原因。根据这种观点，代理人选择香草冰淇淋而不是巧克力冰淇淋的规范性理由最终取决于什么对她有吸引力的事实，而不是关于她的选择是什么样的事实，与态度无关。客观主义者——他们把理由建立在我们所追求的事物的与态度无关的特征上——应该向我们解释为什么选择我们喜欢的东西是理性的，即使不仅仅是因为喜欢是理由的来源。我写这篇论文的目的就是提供这样一个故事。该提议大致是这样的，当一个代理人不能根据她对她最有理由做什么的判断来做出选择时，结构理性就赋予她选择某件事的许可，仅仅因为她喜欢它，而不用规范性理由的权威来赋予她选择的权利。