The positive, non-exclusive inference of only has been famously elusive with respect to its projective status and its content: in some cases the positive inference behaves like a presupposition, while in others it does not; in some cases the inference is non-modal, corresponding to the prejacent of only or an existential counterpart of it, while in others it is modalized. This behavior, we argue, surfaces the exceptive nature of only (cf. von Fintel and Iatridou in Linguist Inq 38(3):445–483, 2007). More specifically, if the import of only is distributed between a minimality and a subtraction component, as has been argued for exceptives (esp. Gajewski in Nat Lang Semant 16(1):69–110, 2008), the apparently irreconcilable properties of only can be captured.

就其投射状态和内容而言， “only”的肯定的、非排他的推论众所周知是难以捉摸的：在某些情况下，肯定的推论表现得像一个预设，而在其他情况下则不然；在某些情况下，推论是非模态的，对应于它的前导或存在对应物，而在其他情况下，它是模态的。我们认为，这种行为体现了only的例外性质（参见 von Fintel 和 Iaridou in Linguist Inq 38(3):445–483, 2007）。更具体地说，如果only的导入分布在极小值和减法分量之间，正如对例外情况所争论的那样（特别是 Nat Lang Semant 16(1):69–110, 2008 中的 Gajewski），那么only的明显不可调和的属性可以被捕获。