At first blush, Sosa’s performance-based approach to epistemic normativity would seem to put us in a position to illuminate important types of epistemic negligence – types whose epistemic significance will be denied by standard evidentialist theories. But while Sosa’s theory does indeed venture beyond standard evidentialism, it fails to provide an adequate account of epistemic negligence. The challenge arises in cases in which a subject is negligent in that she knowingly fails to perform inquiries which it was her responsibility to perform, but where she had good (undefeated) reason to believe that had she done so her judgment would only have been reinforced, and where this higher-order judgment was apt. After arguing that these cases will pose problems for Sosa’s view, I diagnose the difficulty as one that will face any view that treats epistemic negligence either in exclusively performance-theoretic terms or exclusively evidential terms.

乍一看，索萨基于表现的认知规范性方法似乎使我们能够阐明认知疏忽的重要类型——这些类型的认知意义将被标准证据主义理论所否认。但是，尽管索萨的理论确实超越了标准的证据主义，但它未能对认知疏忽提供充分的解释。如果受试者存在疏忽，她故意没有执行本应由她负责执行的询问，但如果她有充分的（不败的）理由相信，如果她这样做，她的判断只会得到加强，就会出现挑战，以及这种高阶判断适用的地方。在论证这些案例会给索萨的观点带来问题之后，我将这一困难诊断为将面临任何仅以表现理论术语或仅以证据术语来处理认知疏忽的观点。