There is much dispute about what we owe the children we are responsible for creating. Some argue that so long as we provide offspring with lives worth living we do no wrong. Others argue that our procreative obligations are weightier and oblige us to provide (or attempt to provide) our offspring with a reasonable opportunity to thrive, or meet some other standard beyond merely providing a life worth living. Our practices and intuitions on this matter are inconsistent. For example, gamete donors who intentionally participate in the project of creating a child are thought to have few obligations to their offspring, but those who create a child accidentally are thought to have weighty obligations. Furthermore, a justification for why we are obliged to provide offspring with more than a life worth living has been elusive. To resolve this puzzle I argue that an under‐theorized element of morality, the directed duty of care, explains why we owe our offspring more than a life worth living.

中文翻译：

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生育义务和直接照顾义务


关于我们欠我们负责创造的孩子什么，存在很多争议。有些人认为，只要我们为后代提供值得过的生活，我们就没有错。其他人则认为，我们的生育义务更为重要，迫使我们为（或试图为）我们的后代提供合理的成长机会，或者满足一些其他标准，而不仅仅是提供值得过的生活。我们在这个问题上的实践和直觉是不一致的。例如，有意参与创造孩子项目的配子捐赠者被认为对其后代几乎没有什么义务，但那些无意中创造孩子的配子捐赠者则被认为对其后代负有重大义务。此外，为什么我们有义务为后代提供不仅仅是值得过的生活的理由一直难以捉摸。为了解决这个难题，我认为，道德中一个未充分理论化的要素，即直接的关怀义务，解释了为什么我们欠我们的后代不仅仅是一个值得过的生活。