The concept of a good life is usually assumed by philosophers to be equivalent to that of well-being, or perhaps of a morally good life, and hence has received little attention as a potentially distinct subject matter. In a series of experiments participants were presented with vignettes involving socially sanctioned wrongdoing toward outgroup members. Findings indicated that, for a large majority, judgments of bad character strongly reduce ascriptions of the good life, while having no impact at all on ascriptions of happiness or well-being. Taken together with earlier findings these results suggest that the lay concept of a good life is clearly distinct from those of happiness, well-being, or morality, likely encompassing both morality and well-being, and perhaps other values as well: whatever matters in a person’s life. Importantly, morality appears not to play a fundamental role in either happiness or well-being among the folk.

哲学家通常认为美好生活的概念等同于幸福的概念，或者可能等同于道德上美好的生活，因此作为一个潜在的独特主题很少受到关注。在一系列实验中，参与者看到了一些小插曲，其中涉及社会认可的针对外群体成员的不当行为。研究结果表明，对于绝大多数人来说，对不良品格的判断会极大地降低对美好生活的归因，而对幸福或幸福的归因则完全没有影响。与早期的研究结果相结合，这些结果表明，美好生活的世俗概念明显不同于幸福、福祉或道德的概念，可能既包含道德又包含福祉，或许还包含其他价值观：无论什么重要的东西，一个人的一生。重要的是，道德似乎对民众的幸福或福祉并没有发挥根本作用。