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The right to privacy and the deep self
The Philosophical Quarterly ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2024-07-29 , DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae091 Leonhard Menges 1
The Philosophical Quarterly ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2024-07-29 , DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae091 Leonhard Menges 1
Affiliation
This paper presents an account of the right to privacy that is inspired by classic control views on this right and recent developments in moral psychology. The core idea is that the right to privacy is the right that others not make personal information about us flow unless this flow is an expression of and does not conflict with our deep self. The nature of the deep self will be spelled out in terms of stable intrinsic desires. The paper argues that this view has advantages over alternative accounts of the right to privacy, that it is extensionally adequate in interesting test cases, that there is a good reason to think that the right to privacy, thus understood, can be justified, and that this view helps identify what kind of information is protected by the right to privacy.
中文翻译:
隐私权和深层自我
本文受有关隐私权的经典控制观点和道德心理学最新发展的启发,对隐私权进行了阐述。其核心思想是,隐私权是他人不让我们的个人信息流动的权利,除非这种流动是我们深层自我的表达且不与我们冲突。深层自我的本质将通过稳定的内在欲望来阐明。本文认为,这种观点比隐私权的其他解释更具优势,在有趣的测试案例中它是外延充分的,有充分的理由认为如此理解的隐私权是合理的,并且这种观点有助于确定哪些信息受到隐私权的保护。
更新日期:2024-07-29
中文翻译:
隐私权和深层自我
本文受有关隐私权的经典控制观点和道德心理学最新发展的启发,对隐私权进行了阐述。其核心思想是,隐私权是他人不让我们的个人信息流动的权利,除非这种流动是我们深层自我的表达且不与我们冲突。深层自我的本质将通过稳定的内在欲望来阐明。本文认为,这种观点比隐私权的其他解释更具优势,在有趣的测试案例中它是外延充分的,有充分的理由认为如此理解的隐私权是合理的,并且这种观点有助于确定哪些信息受到隐私权的保护。