Laws of nature are sometimes said to govern their instances. Spelling out what governance is, however, is an important task that has only recently received sustained philosophical attention. In the first part of this paper, I argue against the two prominent reductive views of governance—modal views and grounding views. Ruling out the promising candidates for reduction supports the claim that governance is sui generis. In the second part of this paper, I argue that governance is subject to a contingency requirement. Laws govern their instances only if those instances are metaphysically contingent. I end by defending the resulting account of governance from two potential objections.

中文翻译：

---

 原始治理


有时据说自然法则支配着它们的情况。然而，阐明什么是治理是一项重要任务，直到最近才受到持续的哲学关注。在本文的第一部分，我反对两种著名的治理简化观点——模式观点和基础观点。排除有希望的减排候选者支持了治理是自成一体的主张。在本文的第二部分中，我认为治理必须满足应急要求。仅当这些实例在形而上学上是偶然的时，法律才管辖它们的实例。最后，我针对两个潜在的反对意见对由此产生的治理说明进行了辩护。