In this paper, I criticize Ethan Jerzak’s view that ‘want’ has only one sense, the mixed expected utility sense. First, I show that his appeals to ‘really’-locutions fail to explain away the counterintuitive predictions of his view. Second, I present a class of cases, which I call “principled indifference” cases, that pose difficulties for any expected utility lexical entry for ‘want’. I argue that in order to account for these cases, one needs to concede that ‘want’ has a sense, according to which wanting is a matter of subjectively preferring p-alternatives to not-p-alternatives. Finally, I introduce some considerations for and against the view that ‘want’ also has another sense, which is roughly synonymous with ‘need’.

中文翻译：

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想要的并不是预期的效用


在本文中，我批评了 Ethan Jerzak 的观点，即“想要”只有一种含义，即混合的预期效用含义。首先，我表明他对“真实”的诉求无法解释他观点中违反直觉的预测。其次，我提出一类案例，我将其称为“原则性冷漠”案例，这些案例给“想要”的任何预期效用词汇条目带来了困难。我认为，为了解释这些情况，人们需要承认“想要”是有某种意义的，根据这种感觉，想要是主观上更喜欢p-替代品而不是非p-替代品的问题。最后，我介绍了一些支持和反对“想要”还有另一种含义的观点的考虑，它大致与“需要”同义。