A popular view is that you deserve credit for a successful performance only if you were aware in some way of what you were doing. It has been argued that some such cognitive condition on creditworthy performance must be true because it is the only way to ensure that one’s success is not an accident. In this paper, I argue against cognitive conditions on creditworthy performance: cognitive conditions are false because there are agents who deserve credit for their successful performances even though they had no idea what they were doing. After presenting my argument and defending it against possible replies, I explore broader implications of the falsity of cognitive conditions in the philosophy of action and of moral worth. I then close by presenting an alternative account of creditworthy performance that explains why success can be non-accidental even if one was not aware of what they were doing.

中文翻译：

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 傻瓜学分


一种流行的观点是，只有当你以某种方式意识到自己在做什么时，你才值得因成功的表现而受到赞扬。有人认为，关于信誉良好表现的某些认知条件一定是真实的，因为这是确保一个人的成功不是偶然的唯一方法。在本文中，我反对关于可信绩效的认知条件：认知条件是错误的，因为有些代理人因其成功的绩效而值得赞扬，即使他们不知道自己在做什么。在提出我的论点并针对可能的答复进行辩护之后，我探讨了行动哲学和道德价值中认知条件的虚假性的更广泛含义。最后，我提出了另一种关于信誉良好表现的解释，解释了为什么即使一个人不知道自己在做什么，成功也可能是非偶然的。