This paper examines the nature of the specific grasp involved in moral understanding. After discussing Hills's ability account of that central component of moral understanding in light of problematic cases, I argue that moral grasp is best conceived of as a type of knowledge that is grounded in a subject's moral appreciation. I then show how and why the relevant notion of moral appreciation is connected to moral virtues and to one's affective and motivational engagement with moral reasons. Finally, I discuss the connection between moral appreciation and a subject's ability to offer moral explanations in relation to the debate between pessimists and optimists about moral understanding's testimonial transmission.

中文翻译：

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道德理解：从美德到知识


本文探讨了道德理解中具体把握的本质。在根据有问题的案例讨论了希尔斯对道德理解核心组成部分的能力解释后，我认为道德把握最好被视为一种基于主体道德欣赏的知识。然后，我将展示道德欣赏的相关概念如何以及为何与道德美德以及一个人对道德原因的情感和动机参与联系起来。最后，我讨论了道德欣赏与主体提供道德解释的能力之间的联系，这些解释与悲观主义者和乐观主义者之间关于道德理解的证言传播的争论有关。