A notable feature of our moral and legal practices is the recognition of privileges, powers, and entitlements belonging to a select group of individuals in virtue of their status as victims of wrongful conduct. A philosophical literature on relational normativity purports to account for this status in terms of such notions as interests, rights, and attitudes of disregard. This paper argues that such individualistic notions cannot account for prevailing and intuitive ways of demarcating the class of victims. The paper is focused on the wrongful infliction of harm, and centers on the mediating role played by impersonal “danger‐making properties” in the determination of the class of victims. The paper begins with an analysis of one of the most well‐ known discussions of negligently‐inflicted harm — from the most famous case of the American common law tradition, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. — and the analysis is then extended to the morality of harm‐doing more broadly, negligent and intentional alike. The paper's chief targets are interest theories of rights — including contractualist theories of moral claim‐rights of the kind defended by R. Jay Wallace — and neo‐Strawsonian Quality of Will theories of “moral injury”.

中文翻译：

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“我不知道是你”：关系规范的客观基础


我们的道德和法律实践的一个显着特征是承认特定群体因其作为不法行为受害者的身份而享有的特权、权力和权利。关于关系规范性的哲学文献旨在用利益、权利和漠视态度等概念来解释这种状态。本文认为，这种个人主义观念无法解释划分受害者类别的普遍且直观的方式。本文的重点是不当造成伤害，并重点关注非人格化的“造成危险的财产”在确定受害者类别中所发挥的中介作用。本文首先分析了关于过失造成伤害的最著名的讨论之一——美国普通法传统中最著名的案例“帕尔斯格拉夫诉长岛铁路公司”——然后将分析扩展到更广泛的伤害行为的道德，无论是疏忽的还是故意的。该论文的主要目标是权利的利益理论——包括R·杰伊·华莱士所捍卫的那种道德主张权的契约主义理论——以及新斯特劳森主义的“道德伤害”意志品质理论。