Familiar semantics for terms like ‘because’ appeal to cause or ground, but according to expressivists moral claims cannot enter into such relations. This calls into question whether expressivists can account for moral explanation. I argue that moral expressivists should also be expressivists about explanation. That is, claims like ‘A because B’ are used to express an attitude, namely that one endorses inferring A from B to be suitable for coming to believe A. This allows expressivists to give due to the asymmetric explanatory commitments of different ethical views. Moreover, the account identifies and explains the nature of moral argumentative discourse as proceeding by identifying similarities and adducing distinctions.

中文翻译：

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表现主义与道德论证


像“因为”这样的术语的熟悉语义诉诸于原因或理由，但根据表现主义者的道德主张不能进入这种关系。这让人质疑表现主义者是否能够解释道德解释。我认为道德表达主义者也应该是解释的表达主义者。也就是说，像“A因为B”这样的主张被用来表达一种态度，即一个人赞同从B推断A适合相信A。这使得表达主义者能够由于不同伦理观点的不对称解释承诺而做出贡献。此外，该叙述识别并解释了道德论证话语的本质是通过识别相似性和引入区别来进行的。